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ABSTRACT 
 
Armed insurgent groups (AIGs) generally see the state as their adversary, and rely on 
violence to get their demands.  Insurgencies are not a new phenomenon, and though they 
may come and go, they should not be seen as a temporary threat.  In fact, they are lasting 
longer, and governments are hard put to control these groups.  These conflicts can also 
spill over to neighboring countries.  The fear of losing control of national borders is a 
palpable one for governments.  Therefore, it is important to understand why these armed 
groups take root, and fester, in their host countries.  This paper examines the impact of 
three critical conditions, ungoverned spaces, weak domestic conditions, and local support 
systems, on the longevity of three armed groups: al-Qaeda of Islamic Maghreb based in 
Mali, Boko Haram of Nigeria and Abu Sayyaf of the Philippines.  For comparative 
purposes, this paper also studies the impact of these indicators on two older AIGs, 
Sendero Luminoso of Peru and the Liberation Tigers of Sri Lanka.  Except for a few 
caveats, such as Boko Haram operating from a “closed” city space instead of a harsh and 
open terrain, and the use of coercive force by some AIGs to “enlist” local support, I 
conclude that there is a general positive correlation between the selected conditions and 
the lifespan of these armed groups.  Since a forceful response has rarely helped to entirely 
resolve these insurgencies, I recommend that the international community securitize 
“insurgencies” so a repertoire of international and regional responses is readily available.   
In the final analysis, however, the solution to these conflicts rests with governments, 
which must solve the root causes of conflicts, that is, poor socio-economic conditions.  
An optimistic start has already been launched with the creation of the Millennium 
Development Goals.  
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Chapter 1  
Rationale 
 
War and security issues in international relations (IR) have been traditionally 
analyzed at the state level.  As a sovereign power, a state has legitimate use of force and 
coercion to implement its policies.  Understanding a state’s behavior vis-à-vis other states 
is the foundation of IR studies.  Today, however, the increasing influence of non-state 
actors (NSAs) within states is reshaping the framework of analysis that is generally used 
to study IR, that is, a framework dominated by realism or liberalism.  NSAs are not 
integral units of a state’s structure, and, therefore, their activities are generally 
independent of the state’s control.  Their world is large, complex and diverse; they range 
from private, multinational and public institutions to militants and terrorists.   In recent 
years, the growing visibility of non-state actors using violence as a strategy to realize 
political goals is presenting a new type of security dilemma within the international 
community – a dilemma that poses threats from below.  Such conflicts are a recurring 
phenomenon,1 and they are, arguably, “…responsible for the largest number of deaths in 
contemporary conflict.” 2   Their challenge to the state’s legitimacy by competing over 
power and position within the state is marking a new trend in international relations, and 
requires a reexamination of security policies and goals.    
                                                            
1	  There	  were	  25	  total	  armed	  [civil]	  conflicts	  between	  2002-­‐2005	  –	  14	  in	  2005	  alone;	  with	  535,890	  civilian	  
deaths	  between	  1989-­‐2005.	  “Human	  Security	  Brief,”	  Human	  Security	  Report	  Project,	  (2006),	  accessed	  
December	  2,	  2012,	  http://hsrgroup.org/human-­‐security-­‐reports/2006/overview.aspx.	  
	  
2	  Isabelle	  Duyvesteyn,	  “Non-­‐state	  actors	  and	  the	  resort	  to	  violence:	  Terrorism	  and	  insurgency	  strategies	  
compared,”	  Humanitarian	  Policy	  and	  Conflict	  Research	  (2007):	  2,	  accessed	  January	  10,	  2013,	  
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/TAGS_nonstateactorsresorttoviolence.pdf.	  
	  
	  
2	  
IR literature since the early 1990s has dealt with the impact of armed non-state 
actors on domestic and international politics, but research explaining the persistence of 
such groups is still rare.  My intention, therefore, is to show that armed groups can persist 
because of environmental conditions that enable them to survive attempts to eradicate 
them.  Using three armed groups as examples, this thesis will study how these groups 
profit by settling in convenient locations, by taking advantage of failing governments and 
by gaining local support.   This research is intended to contribute to ongoing IR research 
on armed groups.   
IR research has disproportionately focused on nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in the post-Cold-War period given 
the ubiquitous movement toward globalization.  The numerical increase in non-state 
actors has led to research on what Sikkink and Keck identify as “transnational advocacy 
networks.”3 These networks construct “spaces” within which non-state actors negotiate 
on a presumed system of shared values.  While these organizations advocated for basic 
needs and human rights, among other things, there are also militant, criminal and terrorist 
networks that also want to create their own spaces within states.   By operating below the 
state level, these armed groups are also leaving an indelible impact on both state and 
international relations.   Localized conflicts have now replaced traditional large-scale 
wars.   In addition, the scale of violence seen in the September 11, 2001, attack in New 
York furthered interest in the power of groups.   The event left a lasting impression, 
which has guided future security policies.  Although terrorist acts were not a new 
phenomenon in countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
                                                            
3 Kathryn	  Sikkink	  &	  Margaret	  E.	  Keck,	  “Transnational	  advocacy	  networks	  in	  international	  and	  regional	  
politics,”	  International	  Social	  Science	  Journal	  159	  (1999):	  89.  
	  
	  
	  
3	  
Development (OECD),4 this blatant attack in the most powerful country in the world set 
off a new trajectory in policy-making.   Refocusing on terrorism as a major security issue 
became “globalization’s first war.”5   
It is important to identify the diversity that exists even within armed non-state 
insurgent groups (hereafter referred to as AIGs).   These may vary in organization, reach, 
explicit goals, and many other factors.  Schultz identifies four types of armed groups, 
which overlap in structure, strategies and goals:6 a) militias are similar to an organized 
military force that challenges the regular army; b) insurgents engage in armed resistance 
to a sitting government; c) terrorists primarily use acts of terror against specific targets; 
and, d) criminal organizations are those that participate in organized extra-legal activities.   
In a sense, these groups can all be seen as insurgents since they engage in active 
resistance against forms of state structures.  In support of this view, Hofmann and 
Schneckener define insurgent groups as those that “are willing and able to use violence to 
pursue their objectives; and are not integrated into formal institutions.7  They seek to 
enhance their power and legitimacy at the expense of the state’s own power and 
legitimacy. Tactically, these groups are involved in asymmetric conflicts, and will resort 
to any means to change the balance in their favor – whether through terrorist acts, guerilla 
                                                            
4	  The	  Organisation	  for	  Economic	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development	  consists	  of	  34	  advanced	  and	  emerging	  
economies	  that	  are	  dedicated	  to	  global	  development.	  
	  
5 Kurt	  M.	  Campbell,	  “Globalization's	  First	  War?”	  The	  Washington	  Quarterly	  25,	  no.	  1	  (2002):	  7.	  	  
	  
6	  Richard	  H.	  Shultz,	  “Global	  Insurgency	  Strategy	  and	  the	  Salafi	  Jihad	  Movement,”	  USAF	  Institute	  for	  
National	  Security	  Studies	  (2008):	  3-­‐4,	  accessed	  December	  13,	  2012,	  
http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss/docs/OCP%2066%20Global%20Insurgency%20and%20Salafi%20Jihad%20
Movement.pdf.	  
	  
7	  Claudia	  Hofmann	  and	  Ulrich	  Schneckener,	  “NGOs	  and	  Nonstate	  Armed	  Actors,”	  United	  States	  Institute	  of	  
Peace	  (2011):	  1,	  accessed	  December	  13,	  2012,	  http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr284.pdf.	  
	  
	  
	  
4	  
operations or violent crimes.  Andreopoulos supports this by claiming that such groups 
will use armed violence against governments and institutions in an atmosphere of 
weakening or collapsing state institutions.8  Their goals are varied and include secession, 
replacement of the status quo, autonomy or freedom to engage in criminal activities.9  As 
another academic sees it, insurgent-sponsored conflicts or insurgencies are really a 
“struggle to control a contested political space, between a state … and one or more 
popularly based, non-state challengers.”10  
Other analysts have argued that there is a predictable set of factors that can 
facilitate the rise of armed insurgent groups.  The literature on rebellions is large, but 
according to Thomas and Casebeer, if certain socio-economic and political factors, such 
as corruption, identity crises, population pressures or resource scarcity, are met with 
government non-action, then these grievances become the basis of a collective form of 
resistance by militant religious movements, warlords, ethno-political groups or criminal 
organizations.11   Additionally, they claim that the “loss in regime legitimacy undermines 
attempts to constitute a ‘citizenry,’ allowing existing identity cleavages … [which 
provide the] embryonic growth factors for gestating VNSA [violent non-state actors].”12 
                                                            
8	  George	  J.	  Andreopoulos,	  “On	  the	  Accountability	  of	  Non-­‐State	  Armed	  Groups,“	  in	  Non-­‐State	  Actors	  in	  the	  
Human	  Rights	  Universe,	  ed.	  George	  J.	  Andreopoulos	  et	  al.	  (Virginia:	  Kumarian	  Press,	  2006),	  157.	  	  
	  
9	  Ibid.	  
	  
10	  David	  Kilcullen,	  “Counter-­‐insurgency	  Redux,”	  Survival	  48,	  no.	  4	  (2006):	  112.	  
	  
11	  Troy	  S.	  Thomas	  and	  William	  D.	  Casebeer,	  “Violent	  Systems:	  Defeating	  Terrorists,	  Insurgents,	  and	  Other	  
Non-­‐State	  Adversaries,”	  USAF	  Institute	  for	  National	  Security	  Studies	  (2004):	  8,	  accessed	  December	  14,	  
2012,	  http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usafa/ocp52.pdf.	  	  
	  
12	  Ibid.,	  p.	  11.	  
	  
	  
	  
5	  
The resilience of armed non-state actors has frustrated the international 
community’s attempts to address this security issue.  They have tried, according to 
Hofmann, policies of counterinsurgency, containment, negotiation and mediation, and 
state-sponsored integration, which, in the absence of state commitment, have all failed.13  
Armed insurgent groups will continue to violate international law and norms, as there is 
no consensus within the international community on specific enforcement policies.  
States think any form of negotiation with armed groups would grant them legitimate 
recognition.  With no real solution at hand within the international community, armed 
insurgent groups (AIGs) will continue to act with impunity from within the “spaces” they 
have created.  To change this, it is thus important to clarify both the reasons for the rise of 
these groups as well as their persistence.  This thesis focuses on the second aspect.  In the 
next chapter, the research design will outline the structure of the thesis, and will also 
include current IR findings on the themes developed in this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
13	  Claudia	  Hofmann	  &	  Ulrich	  Schneckener,	  “NGOS	  and	  Nonstate	  Armed	  Actors:	  Improving	  compliance	  with	  
international	  norms,”	  United	  States	  Institute	  of	  Peace	  Report	  284,	  (2011):	  2.	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Chapter 2 
Research Design 
Armed insurgent groups (AIGs) are not limited to just being participants in 
conflicts; their influence extends beyond conflict areas, and into all spheres of daily life 
that civilians inhabit.  While the states impose their power from above, these AIGs are 
exerting power from within state structures, which makes it harder to uproot them.  
Predictably, this can become a lasting security issue.  Many political theorists have 
attributed the rise of AIGs to a host of factors – including, but not exclusive to, poverty, 
ethnic differences, and, most notably, failed and/or failing states.  While these factors 
may have some impact on the rise of these groups, they do not provide sufficient 
explanations for why AIGs persist even after conflicts have seemingly ended.  Drawing 
from the literature, I will argue that three conditions must be met in order for armed 
group conflicts to be transformed into protracted struggles. 
1) Ungoverned Space:   Although the term is used interchangeably with “safe 
havens,” the definition used here of a safe haven is not the one that means “protected” 
areas during armed conflicts.  I will use the definition that has been presented in a U.S. 
Defense Policy Report, which states that a safe haven is a place that “enables illicit actors 
to operate while evading detection or capture, including ungoverned … areas where 
[they] can organize, plan ... operate in relative security.”1  On the other side of the coin, 
ungoverned areas are locations where “the central government is unable or unwilling to 
extend control, effectively govern, or influence the local population … due to inadequate 
                                                            
1	  Robert	  D.	  Lamb,	  “Ungoverned	  Areas	  and	  Threats	  from	  Safe	  Havens,”	  Ungoverned	  Areas	  Project	  Report	  
for	  Under	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  for	  Policy	  Planning	  (2008):	  6,	  accessed	  on	  December	  17,	  2012,	  
http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/ugash_report_final.pdf.	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governance capacity …” According to the Report, all ungoverned areas can potentially 
become safe havens of this kind.2  Studying ungoverned spaces has become very useful 
because they are predictors of failing or failed states. 
A sovereign state by its very definition is a territorial space bounded by clearly 
demarcated borders or boundaries.  The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 was the first formal 
attempt to separate nation-states using physical “space.”  The creation of “borders” to 
divide and categorize our realities into meaningful spaces is a natural thing for humans.  
Because such spaces are socially constructed, their boundaries are not immutable.  Our 
daily life is spent passing through such “spaces” – home and workplaces, for example – 
that are all created to be functional.  We also structure spaces according to our belief 
systems, affecting our political or socio-cultural identities.   
All actors or players with political aspirations think of a territorial space as 
necessary to starting a movement.  Armed insurgent groups today are learning how to 
operate from within both strong and/or weak states.  It would be too simplistic to think 
that ungoverned space is limited to lawless, isolated areas in weak, failing states (a good 
example is the tribal adjoining areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan).  Indeed, they 
can exist also, for example, in border areas and even within capital cities in strong states, 
where there are always vacuums of power to be exploited.3  As movements expand, 
however, it becomes necessary to locate a convenient, physical space to exploit.  In 
relatively weak states, there are enough pockets of “vacant spaces” that armed insurgent 
groups can occupy as power bases.  These areas are usually far removed from the 
                                                            
2	  Robert	  Lamb,	  “Ungoverned	  Areas.”	  
	  
3	  “Fragile	  States	  and	  Ungoverned	  Spaces,”	  Global	  Strategic	  Assessment	  Report	  (2009):	  101,	  accessed	  
December	  5,	  2012,	  http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/09-­‐GSA2009_Chpt%205.pdf.	  
	  
	  
	  
8	  
core/centralized seat of power, with low population densities, and limited or no 
government authority.   
2) Weak Domestic Institutions:  The second factor that transforms armed group 
conflicts into protracted struggles is the weakness of domestic institutions.  Many 
political scientists and international organizations have come to equate strong states with 
good governance.4  This presumes that such states have the capacity and the necessary 
infrastructure to deliver “public goods” – for example, guarantee human security and rule 
of law, end poverty, and facilitate political participation.5  However, in the absence of 
effective institutions, many countries could easily fail in their sovereign responsibilities.  
On the 2013 Failed States Index, twenty countries were considered “critical” and 
nineteen were “in danger.”6  This report uses twelve indicators as measures, among 
which are economic decline, number of refugees, group grievances, uneven development, 
provision of public services and human rights.7  A major symptom of a failing 
government is the level of corruption and lack of transparency that is perceived by its 
citizens.  States that adopt extractive practices – onerous and arbitrary tax policies and 
bribery of officials are examples – set a course for future economic disasters and social 
discontent.  Clearly, weak states face many constraints.  In varying combinations, these 
indicators provide perfect settings for conflicts.  
                                                            
4	  They	  have	  recognized	  “governance”	  as	  a	  global	  issue	  that	  should	  ensure	  “transparency,	  security,	  
participation	  and	  fundamental	  freedoms.”	  “Governance,”	  United	  Nations	  Report,	  accessed	  January	  3,	  
2013,	  http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/governance/index.shtml.	  
	  
5	  Robert	  I.	  Rotberg,	  “Failed	  States	  in	  a	  World	  of	  Terror,”	  Council	  on	  Foreign	  Relations	  (2002):	  2-­‐3.	  	  
	  
6	  “The	  Failed	  States	  Index,”	  Foreign	  Policy	  Report	  (2013),	  accessed	  February	  6,	  2013,	  	  
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/17/2011_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_ran
kings.	  	   
	  
7	  Ibid.	  
	  
	  
9	  
The link between failing states and small armed conflicts has been established by 
both scholars, such as Robert Rotberg, and research institutes like the Fund for Peace.  
The security threats of armed conflicts to both domestic and international stability cannot 
be minimized.  Such conflicts, in the past two decades, “in and among failed states have 
killed about eight million people, most of them civilians, and displaced another four 
million.”8  According to Rotberg, it is not “the absolute intensity of violence that 
identifies a failed state …[but] the enduring character of that violence …” against the 
government.9  Faced with such persistent conflicts, states remain embattled for long 
periods of time, which can frustrate any attempts to reestablish control.  A weakening 
central authority could even relinquish control in outlying areas or border areas.    
Moreover, when centralized rule is weak, political leaders may rely on existing systems 
of patronage, using traditional ties of kinship and local religious leaders to assert 
“authority” in these areas.   Good governance must be inclusive of all areas and local 
communities in order for governments to function well. 
 3) Local Support Networks:  The third factor is the pull/push factor that keeps 
insurgent groups within a specific location.  In their formative stages, armed groups 
generally set out to establish links with the local communities in order to build local 
bases of support.  This is a prerequisite to becoming an effective insurgent group, 
according to a 2009 Report published by the Federation of American Scientists.10 
Successful insurgencies usually have a loyal following of sympathizers, and strong 
                                                            
8 Rotberg, “Failed States in a World of Terror,” p. 1. 
9  Robert I. Rotberg ed, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2003), 5. 
	  
10 “Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency,” Federation of American Scientists Report (2009): 10, accessed 
February 5, 2013, http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/insurgency.pdf. 
	  
	  
10	  
supporters.  According to this Report, both state and insurgencies will vie for the 
allegiance of this sector of the population, who may support insurgent groups because the 
governments have failed to provide them the necessary public goods.   Simon and Tucker 
call these disenfranchised groups “lumpen” classes, who live in marginal areas and are 
“ignored and denied.”11  They discuss the paradox of insurgents “hiding” so as to not be 
detected by authorities, but yet “hiding” with the knowledge of the locals.  Occupying 
such “hidden” spaces often assumes that there are existing ties based on socio-cultural 
affinities around religion, mores and traditions.  In some cultures (notably Middle Eastern 
and animist), tribal/group honor trumps the Eurocentric focus on individuality.   It is 
therefore valid to explore culture, as well as socio-economic factors, when looking at the 
puzzling fear/attraction dichotomy that defines the relationship between those in control 
and those being controlled.  Having local support is crucial to the survival rate of 
insurgent movements, and local silence is complicit.  It offers the kind of “stability” that 
insurgents need to establish themselves. 
  To assess if these three conditions positively correlate with the persistence of 
AIGs, I will look at three such groups: Al-Qaeda of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko 
Haram (BH) and Abu Sayyaf (ASG).  These groups were deliberately selected from 
different geographical areas, respectively from North Africa (Mali/Algeria), West Africa 
(Nigeria), and Asia (the Philippines) to see if there are varying effects of these conditions 
on armed groups in different environments.   AIGs without question present a major 
security threat.  Relevant security literature will be examined in the next section.  
 
                                                            
	  
11	  David	  Tucker	  and	  Anna	  Simons,	  “The	  Misleading	  Problem	  of	  Failed	  States:	  a	  ‘socio-­‐geography’	  of	  
terrorism	  in	  the	  post-­‐9/11	  era,”	  Third	  World	  Quarterly	  28,	  no.	  2	  (2007):	  394.	  
	  
	  
11	  
International Relations (IR) Literature on the Concept of Security 
“Security” is a contested concept since it has evolved in a rapidly changing 
political world that witnessed world wars, competition between superpowers, the rise of 
post-colonial developing countries, and, generally, shifting alliances within a changing 
international community.  Traditionally, security studies as a field was analyzed at the 
nation-state level, and security meant the protection of state sovereignty, primarily based 
on the strength of the military sector.  Security analysis tended to focus on the state as 
there was a constant fear of external military threats from other states, which therefore 
dictated national and defense policies. Before World War II, security studies was 
restricted to the professional military and diplomatic sectors of the state, but the 
involvement of civilians in policy making during World War II triggered a broader 
interest in security studies.12 
The horrors of two world wars, and the resulting international consensus on the 
need to avoid any such occurrences in the future, made it urgent to find solutions to war.  
This set the stage for security studies as an academic field.  In its early stages, mid 1940s 
to the 1960s, Stephen Walt claims, academics preferred to “ignore nonmilitary sources of 
international tension and to focus solely on military balances.”13  They also advocated 
deterrence theory, a popular concept at this time, which assumes that there will always be 
aggressive states so retaliation can be justified in kind.  This type of preventive measure 
was seen as more effective than questioning the aggressor’s motives for attacking in the 
first place.  However, a shift toward non-military solutions was taking root within the 
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discourses of security studies in the pursuit of “world peace.”  Moreover, the increasing 
exposure to UN-sponsored international norms and non-governmental institutions helped 
reinforce the non-military focus in security studies.  States could now use these norms 
and regimes to arbitrate their conflicts,14 since these norms extend “security” to include 
the human condition.   
In 1994, the United Nations Development program (UNDP), stated that “[h]uman 
security can be said to have two main aspects.  It means, first, safety from such chronic 
threats as hunger, disease and repression.  And second, it means protection from sudden 
and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life—whether in homes, in jobs or in 
communities.”15 The report went on to identify seven specific areas of human security: a) 
economic security from poverty, b) food security or access to food, c) healthy security or 
access to health care, d) environmental security or protection from pollution or depletion 
of resources, e) personal security or physical safety from wars, violence, torture, for 
example, f) community security or freedom from ethnic conflicts or destruction of local 
cultures, and g) political security or protection from abuses of civil, political rights and 
oppression.16 While this definition was all encompassing, it clearly showed how the 
expanded concept of security had acquired legitimacy within the UN.  This view 
imparted on states and the international community a moral responsibility to protect 
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individuals, reinforcing the idea that “human beings, not states, have an intrinsic value 
and should be protected.” 17    
Thus the concept of security has evolved over the years, initiating changes in 
attitudes and behavior.  Within the academic world, security studies had to also undergo 
its own evolution.  The classical IR theorists believed that states will act selfishly because 
in an anarchical system (in the absence of any centralized international power), states 
must engage in wars for reasons of self-interest, security and the need to survive.   The 
state’s pursuit of power is an important goal, and preserving military strength to ensure a 
state’s position and prestige is necessary.   Classical realists believed that conflict stems 
from an imperfect human nature.  The newer neorealists did not focus on human nature, 
but supported the idea that states are rational and autonomous, and will counter any 
security threats in order to survive, and protect their self-interests.  To them, anarchy is 
what drives states’ behavior.   Since to the neorealist, states will preserve and maximize 
their power through enhancing their military capabilities in order to ensure their security, 
this inadvertently creates a security dilemma with other states.  A security dilemma is 
caused by any action of a strong or weak state, which can be interpreted as either a threat 
or a provocation that could potentially destabilize the balance of security within the 
international system.18  Neorealists did not consider that domestic political structures can 
affect a state’s behavior.   
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 The end of the Cold War signaled a resurgence of smaller-scale conflicts, mainly 
ethno-nationalist, within states.  With this change in political reality, there was a 
conscious move within academic circles to develop a balanced discourse that looked at 
security threats and risks at both international and domestic levels.  As mentioned, the 
concept of security had become multidimensional, analyzing threats, not only to states 
per se, but to their peoples.19  The literature that explored the causes and effects of intra-
state conflicts looked mainly at structural factors.  The reasons for the origins of conflicts 
varied from ethnic and religious differences, to failed states, from competition for limited 
resources to socio-political repression, from marginalization and poverty to nationalism.   
While ethno-political conflict are not an entirely new phenomenon, the emphasis on 
“ethnicity” as a causative factor was now stronger, whether due to the savagery of inter-
group or intra-group “ethnic-cleansing,” as seen in the Bosnian and Kosovan wars during 
the 1990s, or the resulting disruptions to the lives of numerous non-combatant civilians.     
Rather than rely on structural theories to explain causes, some political theorists 
have used psychocultural interpretations to show that such conflicts were specific to 
customs, religion, and language.20  It is thought that people’s perceptions of the external 
world and motives for action are based on their individual belief systems, which, in turn, 
inform their behavior in a conflict situation.21 Any form of conflict will invoke security 
fears, and if perceived to threaten group identities will be sufficient to initiate a violent 
reaction.  In this vein, social identity theory argues that groups will engage in collective 
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action through “ingroup bias,” the ability to use positive cultural cues to build a cohesive 
group identity in opposition to an outgroup.22  As Ted Gurr claims, a group could be 
mobilized for action if all the conditions are met: collective grievances, group identity 
and cohesion.23 Such an opportunity could be exploited by extremist leaders, as Slobodan 
Milosevic did in Serbia.  He provoked domestic strife by “forcing” a “rally around the 
flag” because of his perceived political weakness. 24  In fact, these leaders perpetuate the 
group identity by “invoking historical memories and cultural symbols.”25 Such actions 
could create a security dilemma as we saw in the Serbian wars of the 1990s, which 
precipitated large-scale intergroup conflict, and invited external states to intervene.   This 
was a clear example of domestic conflict developing into an international dispute. 
 The shift from state to societal security has been the focus of many social 
constructivist theorists.  A relative new strand of IR analysis, constructivism came into its 
own between the late 1980s to early 1990s with the failure of neorealist and neoliberal 
theories to predict the collapse of the Cold War.  Constructivism offered alternative ways 
to interpret changes in world politics by focusing on state identity and interests.  Looking 
at state identity in particular, Ted Hopf claims that understanding this could predict 
behavior.  Relationships between states are determined by how states are perceived by the 
other.  In other words, “constructivism treats identity as an empirical question to be 
                                                            
22	  Leonie	  Huddy,	  “Contrasting	  Theoretical	  Approaches	  to	  Intergroup	  Relations,”	  Political	  Psychology	  25,	  
no.	  6	  (2004):	  956.	  
	  
23	  	  Ted	  Robert	  Gurr,	  “Minorities,	  Nationalities,	  and	  Ethnopolitical	  Conflict,”	  in	  Managing	  Global	  Chaos:	  	  
Sources	  of	  and	  Responses	  to	  International	  Conflict,	  ed.	  Chester	  A.	  Crocker	  et	  al.	  (Washington	  D.C.:	  United	  
States	  Institute	  of	  Peace	  Press,	  1996):	  66-­‐67.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
24	  David	  A.	  Lake,	  “International	  Relations	  Theory	  and	  Internal	  Conflict:	  Insights	  from	  the	  Interstices,”	  
International	  Studies	  Review	  5,	  no.	  4	  (2003):	  86.	  
	  
25	  Gurr,	  p.	  66.	  
	  
	  
	  
16	  
theorized within a historical context …” whereas realism thinks all states are in and of 
themselves self-interested actors.26  Perceptions of states are socially constructed, and are 
shaped by immaterial aspects of our lives such as culture, ideas and social practices.  
Likewise, states’ interests and behavior will evolve as the context changes.  The impact 
of ideas on beliefs and behavior is revealed more within the society, so constructivists 
explain changes by looking within societies.    
Ole Waever and Barry Buzan are two constructivist theorists from the 
Copenhagen School of IR, which claims that identity is a constitutive element of societal 
security just as sovereignty is for the state.27  The concept of societal security is a 
cornerstone for the Copenhagen School so for them identity plays a large role in shaping 
the direction of security issues.  The study of “identity” is not new; it was a sub-field of 
social psychology during the 1970s that focused on group formation and social 
identification.  Social psychologists looked at how an individual develops a sense of 
belonging vis-à-vis other group members within a specific group, and how that person 
organizes the external world into meaningful categories.28  In this way, we can further 
explore the relevance of societal security from a group level, according to Theiler, who 
sees social identity theory and societal security as not being mutually exclusive.29  He 
interprets societal security as any social formation or grouping having the capacity or 
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perceived ability to survive existential threats. This has now been extended to ethnic-
religious groups, women and Marxists, and others.30   Similarly, Waever et al. show that 
existential threats could target the sovereignty of states.  In other words, if a state loses its 
sovereignty it is no longer a state, and similarly with identity which defines society.  To 
them, it is important to create a “new kind of unit in order to grasp the way other things 
than states [have] become referent objects for security discourse.”31  They acknowledge 
that while “identity” is a socially constructed concept, it does not remain in a permanent 
state of mutability, but can be “solidly sedimented,” thus acquiring a form of stableness.32  
Buzan and Waever note that all identities are inevitably shaped by politics, and even 
traditional realists have used “identity” when analyzing states’ motives or trying to 
understand how states “construct their conception of security.”33    
This departure from the realist and liberal strands of IR theory makes society an 
“independent object,” as opposed to a state-centric unit in IR analysis, because “[s]ociety 
is about identity, about the self conception of communities and of individuals identifying 
themselves as members of a community.”34  However, Bill McSweeney questions this 
approach in arguing that the definitional complexities of these concepts defy application 
to policies and effective security responses.35  Such terms are fluid, and IR theorists 
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cannot assume that they already exist as “entities” or social facts when, in actuality, a 
“society” and an “identity” are results of processes and “negotiation among people and 
interest groups.”36  Implicit in such concepts are elements of change according to the 
socio-cultural contexts so it would be difficult to use them empirically.37  McSweeney 
sees the agent of change as coming from the state level, and dismisses the idea that sub-
state actors have the capacity to change state dynamics – in that case the state could 
descend into anarchy. 38 Only a secured state is able to protect all levels below it.    
Understanding how something becomes a threat is significant to security studies.  
States usually “construct” their threats in terms of their perception of other states’ 
motives, and in the context of their capabilities.  This attitude is what informs security 
policies and states’ behavior.  While it is true that states can be hyper-vigilant and 
paranoid or, on the other hand, nonchalant in their treatment of perceived threats, their 
decision to securitize an issue can set the ball rolling to further actions.  The Copenhagen 
School introduced the concept of securitization, which identifies specific threats as 
urgent, which, in turn, can lead to defensive measures taken by the state.  It is important 
to know that the process of securitizing an issue requires an interpretation of an alleged 
threat, based on belief systems, ideas, impressions, and perceptions.  There are no set 
indicators to identify potential threats.  With this in mind, Barry Buzan uses the threat of 
terrorism as an example.  He claims that terrorism has become a securitized issue in the 
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21st century, which could “structure global security for some decades.”39  Such potential 
threats can also target societal identities, since terrorism can threaten the survival of a 
community.  So, in a way, there is a linkage between terrorism and an identity crisis.  
There are many global threats that can be securitized: international crime, drug and arms 
trafficking, and terrorism are a few.  To what extent they become urgent issues that 
require immediate action is a decision that states and the international community have to 
make.  According to Buzan, a low-priority issue can become a macro-securitized one 
once it achieves global recognition, a commitment to action, and an expected long-term 
duration.40     
 In previous years, as Buzan claims, security was “dominated by the highly 
militarized and highly polarized ideological confrontation between the superpowers,”41 
but in a new multipolar system, security issues are more fluid, though still centrally-
controlled.  He thinks that the prominent security issue in the 21st century will be societal 
security, which revolves around migration between strong core states and weaker, 
underdeveloped ones, as well as “civilizational identities.”42  In the context of the latter, 
given the rising number of insurgencies or small-scale civil conflicts today, many based 
on ethnic identities or socio-economic grievances, one can logically conclude that 
“insurgencies” have become a securitized issue.  Armed insurgent groups (AIGS), 
operating as primary actors in such conflicts, can have a major impact on both the state in 
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conflict and other states with interests in that conflict.  If societal security is now a major 
component in IR research, then studying the genesis and impact of AIGs, which impede 
such security, is relevant.  The next chapter will provide some background on three such 
examples of AIGs located in three distinct geographical locations. 
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Chapter 3 
Case Studies: Background on Three Armed Insurgent Groups (AIGs) 
This chapter will provide background on three AIGs, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Boko Haram, which I have selected 
in order to show how specific conditions abet their growth and ability to resist attempts to 
dislodge them from their “spaces.”  Chapter 4 will look closely at each condition, and 
will argue that without these conditions, the settings will not be opportune for these 
movements to take off, and take root.  
 
Al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
 AQIM attracted the world’s attention when they blatantly proclaimed an 
“independent state” within the state of Mali in March 2012.  However, according to an 
Al-Jazeera report, they were operating behind the scenes in Mali since 2003.1  The article 
stated that “[h]ostage ransom money from European governments was allegedly spread 
around to Malian officials while AQIM was given free rein in Tuareg areas, with a wink 
and a nod from the Malian Army.”2 Apparently, AQIM had amassed a huge fortune, 
mostly from ransoms and drug trafficking between Mali and Europe, making payouts to 
Malian high officials, including the leader.3  Moreover, the Malian government allowed 
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AQIM as early as 2002-2003 to “roam among the camps and villages, to build 
relationships with the people.”4   
AQIM’s geopolitical influence is now growing rapidly within North Africa’s 
Saharan and the Sahelian areas. Since establishing itself as part of the insurgent 
movement in this region, it has either marginalized local resistance Tuareg groups 
fighting for independence or coopted other radical militant groups, all of whose influence 
extends over the territories of Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, and parts of Niger.  These 
groups are a combination of different ethnic groups (Fulani, Songhai, Arabs and 
Tuaregs), each with its own religious and political grievances.  A January 2013 Aljazeera 
article has identified four liberation groups: the separatist Tuareg National Movement for 
the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the Arab National Front for the Liberation of 
Azawad (FLNA), a Songhai Ganda Koy, and the Fulani Ganda Izo.5  A religious 
coalition was formed, comprising AQIM, the Tuareg-majority Ansar al-Dine and the 
Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), which is strengthened by 
shared tribal and kinship ties.6  As a result, there is a constant cross-pollination of ideas 
and activities.   It remains to be seen what level of security risk AQIM will pose to bigger 
states.  It has already drawn France into Malian affairs.  The fear of a neighboring 
Islamist Mali, which is a former colony, proved too much for France which sent about 
4000 troops to Mali in January 2013, an action backed by the United Nations Security 
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Council.7  The aim of France was to contain the rise of Islamic extremism in the 
unpopulated north, and restore Mali’s “territorial integrity.”8 
Many outsiders have been surprised at the rapid advance of AQIM, getting to 
within 200 miles of the Malian capital, Bamako.9  AQIM has not kept secret its intentions 
in northern Mali.  Not only has it claimed that it will liberate Malians from the French 
colonial legacy, but it has already established an Islamic Police, and even instituted 
Shari’a laws in areas they still control.10  AQIM is clearly following in the tradition of its 
more famous predecessor, Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda, which began in Pakistan in 1988, and 
was launched as a radical movement in 1996 when Osama Bin Laden announced a global 
jihad against America.  “Jihad” has many formulations.  It embodies “righteous causes” 
where action is required to create a religious and moral order, and also advocates the 
individual struggle to follow in the path of God.11  As Paul Heck claims, “[a]ll religious 
communities face this tension between religious inspiration and religious action.”12  
Today, jihad is being adapted to satisfy the cultural and political needs of actors who 
liberally employ its usage as justification for their causes.  In many religious-inspired 
insurgencies today, jihad fulfills both the need for individual motivation and justification 
of political aims.  
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 Before AQIM appeared on the international scene, many of its early founders had 
fought in the 1980s Afghan war against the Soviets.  Known as the “Algerian” Afghans, 
they absorbed the military and ideological experiences of fighting a jihad against foreign 
occupiers.  Upon their return to Algeria after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, they rejoined 
local Algerian Islamic groups and began engaging in a jihad against the government’s 
security forces.  The leading Islamist party at the time, Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), had 
won the municipal elections in 1990, but its political victory was soon vacated by a new 
electoral law, which was passed in 1991 by the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN).  
A coalition of splinter Islamic groups then began to move against the newly-elected 
military-influenced government in 1992, and the situation devolved into a period of 
bloody conflicts from 1991-1999.  A 1999 government-sponsored amnesty took effect 
and the conflict that led to over 150,000 deaths ended.13   
In the aftermath, there were many competing elements within the Islamic 
grouping that sought political legitimacy.  They were varied in their commitment to the 
political status quo and their own armed struggles.  For example, the Islamic Salvation 
Front or FIS wanted to pursue a politically-oriented jihad, while the Islamic Armed 
Group (GIA) preferred a religious jihad against the government.  As a result, in-fighting 
and ideological differences caused a split within the Islamist grouping, and many factions 
disbanded.  Surviving elements of GIA broke away to form the new Groupe Salafist pour 
la Predication et le Combat (GSPC).  It is this splinter group that later merged with Al-
Qaeda elements.14   
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After the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, the GSPC transitioned from a jihad 
movement to a transnational one, serving as a “battleground against ‘infidel’ America.”15  
Its first “global attack” came in December 2006 near the capital city of Algiers when it 
targeted a bus of foreign employees from Haliburton, a major U.S. services and 
construction company.16  This attack recast the movement into a quasi-global one as 
evident in the decision to target foreign companies.  A month after, GSPC became 
AQIM, and embarked on a series of calculated attacks on other foreign targets.   First, it 
attacked a Russian gas installation in March 2007 to show its solidarity with Chechnya.  
Then, it bombed an Algerian oil and gas facility in April 2007 because of past grievances 
with the Algerian government.  A few months later, in December 2007, it attacked the 
offices of the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), describing it as “the den of 
global heresy” with “[c]rusaders who are occupying our lands and plundering our 
treasures.”17  During the same year, AQIM stepped up its attacks against security sources, 
foreign targets, and symbols of the Algerian government.  It targeted foreign oil workers, 
diplomats, soldiers, and even the President, Abdelaziz Bouteflika.18 It was equally bold 
when it kidnapped the UN special envoy in late 2008 in Niger’s capital, Niamey.  Many 
of the armed attacks were deliberately done by suicide bombers to inflict casualties.   
For the next two years, AQIM operated with impunity from different areas within 
Algeria.  Regional governments were concerned that AQIM was spreading its influence 
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in the surrounding areas, and establishing ties with other militant cells.  As a precaution, 
Tunisia and Morocco arrested many alleged AQIM militants, and the Algerian 
government began a series of effective military campaigns, forcing radical members to 
find refuge elsewhere.  The early attempts of AQIM to strengthen its “global” influence 
beyond the regional borders, however, did not fare well, according to Stephen Harmon.19 
The resort to criminal activities, for example smuggling cocaine and kidnapping for 
ransom, indicated that AQIM was either biding its time, building up cash reserves or had 
given up on its global plans.  Not helping was the media attention brought to this region.  
Jeremy Keenan thinks that the alliances between France, Algeria and the U.S. to limit the 
influence of AQIM “exaggerated … the danger posed by GSPC/AQIM [in order] to 
advance their own agendas.”20 In other words, the West, especially the U.S., fabricated 
these terrorist threats to “justify launching a Saharan-Sahelian front in the U.S. global 
war on terror (GWOT).”21 Algeria and other North African countries are rich in oil and 
natural resources (phosphates in the Western Sahara and uranium in Niger), and the 
conflicts could serve as a convenient pretext for the U.S. if it really wants to involve itself 
in North African affairs.   
 In any case, by 2010, the AQIM had become a Saharan-based organization, 
operating mainly from the northern areas of Mali and Niger, east Mauritania, and also 
from within south Algeria, where there are large stretches of ungoverned spaces.  It also 
established ties with the local Tuaregs, semi-nomadic Bedouin tribes, who have inhabited 
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the northern areas of Africa for centuries.  The Tuaregs’s loyalty to a specific sovereign 
state is usually in question since they have resisted several attempts to become settled 
peoples.  They have in the past agitated for self-determination and autonomy in northern 
Mali, a landlocked area that is one of the poorest nations in the world.  Since the military 
coup in March 2012, which has provided an opportune moment for both groups to 
establish a base for their respective movements, the situation of the Tuaregs remains 
precarious. 
The absence of a stable government in Mali is allowing AQIM to forge alliances 
both from within and without.  As a U.S. State Department Report claims, AQIM is 
networking with other terrorist groups in nearby and outlying regions, such as Nigeria’s 
Boko Haram, Somalia’s Al-Shabaab and Yemen’s Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP).22  It has so far engaged in low-level assassinations, kidnappings, and arms and 
narcotics trafficking to finance its activities, possibly becoming the “wealthiest affiliate” 
from these efforts.23  By merging and allying with local strains of insurgencies, groups 
such as Ansar al-Din and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), 
AQIM is adapting to its locale, and ensuring its survivability.  However, according to 
Masters, because it feels confident of its control over its occupation in certain “spaces,” it 
is marginalizing the Tuaregs’ separatist efforts by imposing its own brand of the Shari’a 
law on locals.24  Such efforts by AQIM to build legitimacy within the local populace as a 
“religious” authority seem to indicate that it plans to be there for a long time.   
                                                            
22	  Master,	  p. 4. 
	  
23	  David	  Lewis,	  “Al	  Qaeda's	  richest	  faction	  dominant	  in	  north	  Mali-­‐US,”	  Reuters,	  Jul. 26, 2012. 
	  
24	  Masters,	  p.	  5.	  
	  
	  
	  
28	  
Boko Haram 
 Like AQIM, Boko Haram’s beginnings in Nigeria are rooted in a Islamic 
conservative or Salafi-inspired ideology.  The term “Boko Haram” is a popular 
translation of “Western Education is forbidden” or, in official Arabic, Jama’atu Ahlis 
Sunna Lidda’awati wal Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s 
Teachings and Jihad).  Boko Haram (hereafter BH) is the product of a post-colonial 
world that saw localized neo-patrimonial networks in northern Nigeria replacing 
centralized political control, and also saw a deterioration in living standards, general 
autonomy of the Muslim populace under a Christian government, widespread 
government corruption, and failing socioeconomic and political institutions.  Like AQIM, 
it is seeking to install an Islamic state ruled by sharia law, but, unlike AQIM, BH focuses 
more on corrupt domestic institutions than foreign influences in Africa.  In fact, 
according to Walker, it has “grown at a time when there are many national issues that 
draw anger and feed the group.”25   
 Despite Nigeria’s status and wealth as a rentier state (oil exports provide most of 
the national income), it is unable to stop the mushrooming insurgencies that have taken 
hold in several provinces outside the main regions of Lagos and Abuja.  Since its 
independence in 1960 from the British, Nigeria has been caught in a circle of alternating 
civilian and military governments, which probably explains why the current government 
is still struggling to centralize its rule.  There are around 250 ethnic and linguistic 
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groups,26 and the competition for power and resources is centered mainly on three 
groups: the Muslim Hausa-Fulani is the North, Christian Yorubas in the Southwest, and 
mainly Christian Igbos in the southeast.  Nigeria holds an influential position in Africa 
given its wealth and political status, but it faces similar problems as other underdeveloped 
countries.27  It is this reality that Boko Haram (BH) has decided to challenge.   
Boko Haram was started by Mohammed Ali in 2002 in the city of Maiduguri, 
located in the northeastern province of Borno.  In the pre-colonial period, the Muslim 
Caliphate that had been based in the Sokoto region had had relative autonomy in an area 
comprising northern Nigeria, Niger and Southern Cameroon.  Under British occupation 
beginning in 1903, the caliphate lost its political control over its Muslim population and 
became part of the British dominion.  This loss of autonomy triggered many Islamic-
inspired nationalist movements against the British in that area, setting a precedent for 
similar movements later.  By the early 2000s, Ali was using radical Islamist youth 
organizations as a platform to call for a “true” Islamic society because he felt that the 
Nigerian state was becoming too corrupt and secular.  His solution was to adopt the 
sharia law or Islamic law.  Ali’s ambitions ended in a violent confrontation with the 
police in December 2003.  Apparently, there was a community dispute over the fishing 
rights to a village pond, which escalated into a shootout between the police, army and 
Ali’s followers.  In the aftermath, around 70 people died, including Ali.   The 
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disproportionate reaction of the police and the army transformed BH from a local radical 
group into an organized armed movement.   
Surviving members regrouped under a new leader, Mohammed Yusuf, who 
helped BH evolve to a different level.  For five years following this event, Boko Haram 
was largely dormant, focusing on rebuilding its organization. It did not completely 
remain invisible, but was generally ignored by authorities. Although the Nigerian media 
and even the U.S. government took notice of this organization, no one, including 
Nigerian officials, felt that Boko Haram would become a threat.28  The reluctance of the 
politicians to act against BH during its formative years would later be their undoing as 
the government is now trying to contain a more organized BH today.  During these five 
years, BH established a new mosque in Maiduguri, which would remain its base of 
operations. It became a “state within a state,” creating its own religious police, building a 
farm, offering food and financial subsidies, and, most likely, recruiting unemployed 
Nigerian youth and poor refugees coming from neighboring Chad.29  It also took 
advantage of the government’s complacency by expanding into other neighboring 
provinces, such as Nauchi, Yobe, and Niger state.  The financial sources of BH’s 
expansion are not well known, but there are reports that they receive funds from rich 
Salafi members in Saudi Arabia, and wealthy Muslims in the north.30  
The years between 2003 and 2009 passed uneventfully until an event that changed 
the dynamics of BH’s campaign of resistance against the state.  What began as a funeral 
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march, led to an argument, and then a few days of shootings between BH followers and 
the police, resulting in a summary execution of suspected members, including the leader, 
Mohammed Yusuf.  His execution was captured on videotape. 31  The decision by the 
government to brutally suppress Boko Haram led to the death of around 800 people in the 
ensuing civil conflict.  This disproportionate use of force further radicalized Boko Haram, 
and the movement soon gained impetus with the arrival of a new, charismatic leader, 
Abubakar Shekau, a local businessman.   
For a short time, BH went underground, but soon resurfaced in 2010, and it 
continued its assassinations and attacks, destroying police vehicles, engaging in drive-by 
shootings, and for the first time, using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as an 
instrument of violence.32  In one of its attacks, it liberated a prison, possibly acquiring 
more recruits to replace those lost in 2009.33 Another deadly attack in the city of Jos 
ended in the death of 80, mostly Christians.  On Christmas Eve in 2010, BH set half a 
dozen bombs near churches and markets, killing many civilians.34 Similar attacks against 
security forces and Christians continued periodically during the next two years.  In 2011, 
BH assassinated political officials and police officers, and also exploded bombs near 
army barracks, around the time leading up to, and after the Nigerian elections in April 
2011. The results of the elections, which produced a Christian president, Goodluck 
                                                            
31	  David	  Cook,	  “Boko	  Haram:	  A	  Prognosis,”James	  a.	  Baker	  III	  Institute	  for	  Public	  Policy,	  December	  16,	  2011,	  
11-­‐12,	  http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/REL-­‐pub-­‐CookBokoHaram-­‐121611.pdf.	  	  	  	  
	  
32	  Boko	  Haram’s	  knowledge	  of	  improvised	  explosive	  devices	  (IEDs)	  was	  sophisticated	  enough	  to	  require	  
outside	  help,	  most	  likely	  from	  the	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  network.	  Ricardo	  Rene	  Laremont,	  “Boko	  Haram,	  Al	  Qaeda	  in	  
the	  Islamic	  Maghreb,	  and	  Al-­‐Shabab,”	  House	  Committee	  on	  Homeland	  Security,	  accessed	  April	  1,	  2013,	  
http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20Laremont.pdf.	  
	  
33	  By	  2010	  there	  were	  probably	  5000	  to	  8000	  members.	  Cook,	  “Boko	  Haram,”	  p.	  12.	  	  	  
	  
34	  Walker,	  p.	  5.	  
	  
	  
	  
32	  
Jonathan, further reinforced BH’s beliefs that Muslims would continue to be 
marginalized.   
BH did not stop its attacks against churches and government offices after the 
election.  Its boldest attack came in August 2011 when a suicide attack on the UN 
headquarters in Abuja led to the death of 23 people, with 76 injured.35  It showed that 
Boko Haram was looking beyond national targets.  This was the first “foreign” target, and 
it “launched Boko Haram onto world news and established it as a militant group with the 
technical, and doctrinal, capacity to produce suicide bombs.”36  In 2012, BH looked for 
new targets in schools and press offices.  In March, it burned down 12 public schools, 
affecting the education of some 10,000 students.  By the end of that year, and as a result 
of BH actions against the government, 770 people were killed, the largest amount in any 
one year.37  A Human Rights Watch Report puts the total dead between 2009 to early 
2012 around 2800.38   
The gradual evolution from a gathering of discontented youth to a movement bold 
enough to attack the UN headquarters suggests that the BH movement should not be 
dismissed simply as a sectarian conflict.  Since its resurgence in 2010, it has wreaked 
socio-economic havoc in the northern provinces.39  The borders with neighboring Chad, 
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Niger and Cameroon had to be closed, limiting commercial trade between the countries.  
BH is also willing to step out of its geographical space to pursue its goals. Most recently, 
in February 2013, it crossed the porous borders between Nigeria and Cameroon to kidnap 
seven French tourists as retaliation against French military incursion into Mali.  It is 
publicly linking itself to other insurgent groups.  In fact, there have been reports that 
Boko Haram has been in contact with AQIM and Al-Shabaab of Somalia, which was 
bound to happen as a matter of course.40  Such an alliance, according to a 2011 Homeland 
Security Report, could have “destabilizing effects throughout West Africa” since Nigeria 
is “the pivotal state in West Africa.”41  
 
Abu Sayyaf Group 
Another insurgent group with similar aspirations as Boko Haram and AQIM is the 
Abu Sayyaf Group or ASG (“bearer of the sword” in Arabic) of the Philippines, whose 
members want to create a political Islamic state for the Muslim majority.  Like AQIM, it 
has been using ransoms from kidnapping as a major source of funding, and has also 
carried out assassinations, extortion and bombings.  The U.S. Department of State has 
added this group to its list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.42 For a time, it was 
operating from the outermost islands, but the Filipino government’s military campaigns, 
along with US assistance, have now limited the group’s operations to the southernmost 
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areas of the Philippines.  As the second largest archipelago in the world, the Philippines 
contains isolated areas in the Sula Archipelago (Sulu Province) and Mindanao islands 
(Basilan Province), which have now become the stronghold for the Abu Sayyaf Group.  
These areas are in close proximity to Malaysia, which is facing its own internal strife 
with extremist elements.  Kidnapping for money might create an impression to outsiders 
that ASG is just a bandit group, but it has evolved to being a fully-fledged insurgent 
group.   
The exact origins of ASG are in dispute, but there is a consensus that Al-Qaeda 
was involved in its creation, and it is forging ties to other insurgent groups operating in 
the southern areas of the country.  Muslim separatists have been fighting in the 
Philippines for more than thirty years because they are seeking an independent Islamic 
province in the south.  Rommel Banlaoi argues that ASG was created by the Philippines 
military in the 1990s to “penetrate the ranks of Muslim radicals in Southern Philippines” 
in order to become informers for the state.43  There is another report that ASG split from 
the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), a major Muslim separatist movement 
operating in the 1990s, over direction of the movement.44 Many of these insurgent leaders 
had fought in the Afghan wars of the 1980s, and ASG founder, Abdurajak Janjalani, was 
no exception.  It was his decision to break away from MNLF in 1991 that signaled the 
start of ASG.  Upon announcing his new group, Janjalani sanctioned the bombing of a 
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Christian missionary ship docked in a southern port, which killed two foreign 
missionaries.45      
Since the 1960s, the Filipino government has been in a de-facto military conflict 
with its many insurgent groups.  At one point ASG had much influence on the island of 
Mindanao in the south, but with U.S. anti-terror assistance starting in 2002, the Filipino 
government was able to limit the operating bases of ASG, restricting them to the Basilan 
Islands.  Additionally, the government signed a compromise with Mindanao-based 
MNLF in 1996, which had been fighting a secessionist movement for about 40 years.  
MNLF was offered more autonomy over parts of the mineral-rich island of Mindanao, 
where the Muslim majority in the Philippines live.  Mindanao is the country’s third 
largest island, and MNLF was given more “control” over Islamic law, education, and 
access to government subsidies and benefits.  Over a two decade-span (1970s-90s), 
secessionist conflicts between MNLF and the government claimed the lives of around 
120,000 people, and displaced two million.46  The island of Mindanao has been the focal 
point of Muslim struggles against the government for decades.  It is strategically located 
in the south of the country, miles away from the capital, and strategically close to 
surrounding countries, such as Indonesia, South Thailand, and Malaysia, where radical 
Muslim groups are. 
The 1996 MNLF compromise gave the government a respite from fighting one of 
the better organized groups, but MNLF’s other offshoots, MILF and Abu Sayyaf, are 
adamantly opposed to any form of agreement with the government, preferring to fight on.  
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Of the two groups, MILF commands more attention from the government since it has 
come very close many times to signing a peace agreement.47  ASG, on the other hand, is 
considered the most radical and extreme Islamist group, faithful to its goal for a separate 
Islamic state in the south.  Filipino officials called them “by far the most dangerous group 
in the country today,” which could become a “magnet for dissatisfaction” among young 
disenfranchised Muslims.48    
When	  ASG’s founder, Abdurajak Janjalani was killed by Filipino forces in 1998, 
he was quickly replaced by his brother Khadaffy Janjalani, who led the group from 1998-
2006.   During this period, ASG engaged in a spate of kidnappings and extortion to 
increase its financial profits.  As a result, it received millions of dollars from foreign 
countries, such as Libya, Malaysia and Germany.49  It also increased pressure on the 
government by mounting some 378 armed attacks, which led to the deaths of 288 people 
between 1991-2000.50  One of its worst attacks occurred in 2004 when it bombed a 
passenger ferry in Manila Bay killing over 100 people.51  Although ASG numbers are 
relatively small, there is evidence that they are in possession of highly-sophisticated 
weapons and bomb-making skills.52 Its lucrative financial assets from ransoms have been 
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used to recruit and train new members.53  The Filipino government has already been 
managing its many conflicts with U.S. assistance.  However, it has been using primarily 
military force to uproot these groups, which is proving much more challenging than 
expected.   
Since the death of Khadaffy Janjalani in 2006, there have been many nominal 
heads and commanders of Abu Sayyaf.  The most recent one is Raddulan Sahiron who is 
on the FBI Most Wanted Terrorist List.54  Another is Isnilon Habilon, who has a $5 
million reward to his name, and is believed to be in Basilan.55 Both have been accused of 
kidnapping Americans and other foreign nationals in the 1990s.  Since MNLF and MILF 
signed, symbolically or not, agreements with the Filipino government, this has created a 
competition of sorts over control of territory in the south, as well as over ransom prizes, 
Islamic legitimacy, and credibility in the eyes of the people.  This was highlighted, in 
February 2013, by a violent clash on the island of Jolo between Abu Sayyaf and MNLF, 
which, reportedly, was most likely acting with the government’s tacit consent.56  MNLF 
claimed to be “cracking down on Abu Sayyaf bandits in Sulu,” and fighting to free any 
kidnapping victims.57 The Filipino army chose to be bystanders, and was only concerned 
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that the clash did not spill over into civilian areas.58   Abu Sayyaf was in the news again 
in March 2013 when members released an Australian man they had kidnapped in 2011.  
The security threats of armed insurgent groups to the stability of states are clear, 
and while governments are using primarily military methods to end these civil conflicts, 
this does little to even contain the conflicts.  The following chapter looks at conditions 
that may be facilitating the durability of these AIGs, even in the face of repressive and 
disproportionate use of force by states. 
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Chapter 4 
Conditions that Prolong Life of AIGs 
The previous chapter provided background on the three armed insurgent groups 
(AIGs) that will be used as case studies.  This chapter will assess specific conditions, 
which, according to my hypothesis, abet their longevity, and allow AIGs to weather 
changes at both national and international levels.  As hypothesized, three conditions must 
be present for AIGs to be transformed from fledgling movements into groups engaged in 
protracted struggles.  They are: ungoverned spaces, weak domestic institutions, and a 
network of local support.  These conditions should be understood not as isolated factors, 
but as interdependent ones.   
 
Ungoverned Spaces 
The three armed insurgent groups are located in different geographical regions of 
the world, and it remains to be seen if each group is impacted by “ungoverned spaces.” 
To recap the definition of ungoverned spaces, they are “vacant” spaces, used as 
operational bases, either physical (territorial land) or non-physical (“gaps” in governance 
that allow illegal activities to flourish). In its inchoate form, and as a matter of course, a 
movement needs time and space to organize and mobilize in order to expand, 
hierarchically or laterally.  The main question here is: why do insurgent groups install 
themselves in a specific area?   
AIGs exploit three aspects of ungoverned spaces: a) geographical features of 
these spaces; b) the distance between operational base and seat of government power; 
and, c) porous borders.   Ungoverned space is a relevant issue to security because it not 
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only predicts when conflicts might recur, but it reveals the symptoms of failed or failing 
states.  In fact, Clunan and Trinkunas think that the prevalence of ungoverned spaces is 
the major security challenge of the 21st century.1    
 
Geographical Characteristics of AIG Locations 
The operational bases that the AIGs inhabit are varied, but are strategically 
beneficial to their cause.  The topography of selected terrains can play an important role  
in preserving and protecting the AIGs from authorities.  This holds true for AQIM and 
Abu Sayyaf, though not for Boko Haram, which relies on carving out “safe havens” 
within the city limits of Maiduguri to use as its operational bases.  So, in this case, 
“ungoverned spaces” would refer to the non-physical definition. 
 Source: http://www.futura-sciences.com  
 AQIM has settled in a desert and mountainous area, known as the Adrar des 
Ifoghas (see Map 4.1).	    Prior to 2012, when they were becoming involved in Malian 
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Map 4.1: Moutainous areas of the Adrar des Ifoghas.       
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separatist conflicts, they had occupied the Great Kabylie mountain region of northeastern 
Algeria.  From these areas, AQIM used to launch attacks on Algerian military bases.  In 
Mali, the Adrar des Ifoghas alone covers an expanse of 250,000 square kilometers, 
consisting of deserts, plains, rocky terrain, and valleys.  It is an impenetrable area, and 
requires the knowledge of local Tuareg settlers, who have inhabited this area for 
centuries, to move around.  The harsh landscape has, so far, deterred any comprehensive 
efforts to uproot AQIM because of its inaccessibility and remoteness.  Thus far, there 
have been no signs of the government trying to establish a presence in the area to monitor 
AQIM or secure the area. 
Boko Haram, on the other hand, is not protected by similar forces of nature.  It 
has instead taken refuge within the city of Maiduguri in the state of Borno.  Suffice it to 
say, however, that Maiduguri, itself, is distant from Nigeria’s capital, Abuja (see next 
section).  By creating a “safe haven” among the local people, it has been able to escape 
all government’s military efforts to dislodge them.  By operating within the confines of a 
city, it has to rely heavily on its local networks to maintain its presence.  This will be 
discussed in a later section.   
The Abu Sayyaf Group also relies on its relative isolation from the capital to 
conduct its operations.  Although it is limited to several small islands in the southern 
regions of the Philippines, it still moves around with impunity to other areas.  The 
topography of these islands is mainly a combination of mountainous and jungle terrain 
that is “pockmarked by underground caves.”2 Sahni agrees that the landscape is an 
impediment to the Filipino government’s efforts to neutralize ASG.  Thus far, the 
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government has shown its incapacity to maintain a constant presence in over 1700 square 
kilometers of mountains and jungles across the Basilan Islands.3    
 
Distance between AIGs and the Seat of Government 
All three AIGs are located in areas that are far from the seat of government 
power.    AQIM and its allies control roughly 300,000 square miles, in the northern areas 
of land-locked Mali, out of a total 478,839 square miles (see Map 4.2).4  The northern 
areas are home to approximately 1.3 million people of a total population of 4 million.   
Map 4.2: Map shows AQIM influence in the Sahelian areas. 
 
The coalition of Islamist groups wanted to create a Tuareg homeland in the northern 
territories, known as Azawad.   This breakaway “state” would have contained three of the 
largest Malian cities, Kidal, Timbuktu and Gao, which have a combined GDP of US $1 
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billion.5  The Islamists had planned to use Gao as the temporary capital, but the 
intervention of the French and Malian forces in early 2013 pushed them out of these 
cities.  The cities are of strategic importance since they present an artificial border 
between the north and the government-controlled south.  The takeover of any city (or 
cities) would mark the consolidation of control by a militant group in the region.   
An estimate of the distance between the Malian capital, Bamako, and the 
mountain ranges where the AQIM has settled is around 1700 Km (or 1050 miles), which 
provides an isolation that benefits the group.   This distance is impeding France’s efforts, 
since its intervention in early 2013, to control the movements of insurgents in and out of 
the main cities, since insurgents blend in with civilians.  France is hoping that African 
peacekeepers will replace them after they leave, but, according to a New York Times 
article, the African forces are weak and unprepared, and will have to face “guerrilla 
fighters with far more experience in desert warfare than they have.”6   The U.S. has also 
provided, over a four-year period, both military and financial assistance in the form of 
surveillance drones, and $550 million for the training and equipping of African forces.7 
Even with the intervention of two major powers, there is no sign that AQIM’s foothold in 
the area is decreasing.  The distance between its base and the capital prevents any form of 
concerted resistance by government security forces.  
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Map 4.3: Map of Boko Haram's influence in Northern Nigeria.   
 Boko Haram has selected its space based on convenience and significance.  Its 
base is located in Maiduguri, the largest city in the Borno province in northeastern 
Nigeria, where the majority of Nigerian Muslims reside (see Map 4.3).  Its distance from 
the capital, Abuja, is roughly 692 km (538 miles).   The city lies on the pilgrimage route 
from Senegal to Mecca, and its proximity to Sokoto, whose sultan is the symbolic leader 
of Nigeria’s 70 million Muslims, gives the city some importance in the north.   
A coincidence of factors may have allowed Boko Haram to take root here: the 
tradition of Muslim nationalist resistance to British rule; the long legacy of Muslim 
presence and culture in the area; and the realities of decades of neglect suffered under the 
Nigerian government since its independence in 1960, to name a few.8  Throughout its 
insurgency, BH has kept its base in the same geographical location.  Although state 
security forces have stationed military bases in the northern areas, they are not able to 
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control and contain BH operations, because they are firmly embedded among the civilian 
population.   
On the other hand, the long unprotected coastlines of the many islands in the 
Philippines provide unlimited access and movement to its insurgents.  Abu Sayyaf’s 
space and influence freely extends over a few islands in the southern part of the country –  
    Map 4.4: Map showing Abu Sayyaf’s influence in the South.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
parts of Mindanao, Jolo and Basilan (see Map 4.4).  The Philippines archipelago consists 
of over 7,100 islands, of which only 2000 are inhabited.  Its capital, Manila, is in the 
north, located some 900 km from the island of Basilan.  Similarly to Boko Haram, the 
Abu Sayyaf Group originated in an area with traditional ties to Muslim culture, where the 
disenfranchised Muslim minority group must coexist with Christians in a largely Catholic 
country.  This cultural reality, coupled with the geographical isolation of being located in 
the southern islands, helps ensure a relatively “safe” area far removed from central 
authorities in the north.   
The distances between the bases of centralized rule and the operational bases of 
each AIG should not be underestimated, especially since they can inform government 
 Source: National Counterterrorism Center at www.nctc.gov 
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policies on civil conflicts.  The necessary logistics to control and limit insurgent activities 
can place a huge burden on developing countries, such as the need to have mobile troops, 
transport supplies across large distances, maintain security bases to monitor AIG 
activities, and ready financial outlays to do all the above.   The large distance between an 
AIG operational base and the centralized power in the capital is further complicated by 
unsecured porous borders, which “define” these ungoverned spaces.  This allows AIGs to 
operate without disturbances from authorities since they are not held to the same laws as 
governments in moving “freely” across states.  
 
Porous Borders 
One of the hallmarks of good governance is the ability of a government to secure 
its state’s borders, ensuring a state’s sovereignty.  Failure to do so can lead to 
innumerable problems, such as transnational conflicts, border issues and criminal 
activities. “Borders” are considered “institutions,” according to Salehyan, since they 
“demarcate legal or de facto lines of military control and political jurisdiction.”9 The 
state’s ability to use force within its territory is tied to its capacity to control the areas 
within its legal borders.  Once insurgent groups have identified the “legitimate” 
boundaries between governed and ungoverned spaces, they will do their utmost to avoid 
state repression as the “initial process of rebel mobilization is extremely precarious 
because the opposition cannot survive a decisive attack.”10  
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AQIM’s operational base in the Adhar des Ifoghas ranges borders Algeria, which, 
because of its harsh terrain, permits easy border crossings, undetected by authorities.  
Unlike AQIM, Boko Haram does not inhabit a harsh terrain, but is strategically placed in 
an area that is contiguous to Chad, Cameroon and Niger, relatively weak states with loose 
border controls.   There are not many credible reports about the movements of BH across 
the many shared borders, but a kidnapping in February 2013 of a French family in 
Cameroon shows the potential for cross-border operations.11   Similarly, with Abu 
Sayyaf, the generally unpatrolled coastlines of the many islands facilitate easy access into 
adjoining territories, neighboring islands and countries.  Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand lie very close, and, more importantly, also host sections of populations that seek 
a separatist state.   
Once borders are unsecured, insurgents are able to create spaces in neighboring 
countries, as we see in the case of AQIM, moving from Algeria to neighboring Mali.  
Porous borders not only allow insurgents to move back and forth to escape repression, 
but also to provoke new conflicts with “settled” insurgents in neighboring countries.  
Moreover, conflicts can become especially difficult to manage if they are located in areas 
that “involve contiguous spaces juxtaposing different forms and levels of governance,” 
which could lead to either implosion or contagion.12  Ungoverned spaces are an indicator 
of the level of good governance within a state.  States may have weak governance, but 
still be able to control their borders.  This would happen if states are strongly militarized 
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or conveniently located near strong states, which would enforce border protection.  In the 
absence of such fortuitous factors, insecure borders are an indirect effect of weak 
domestic institutions.   
 
Weak Domestic Institutions 
Discussions on failed and failing states became an important part of security 
discourses after the terrorist attacks in September, 2011.13  However, according to 
Stewart Patrick, as there are no clear definitions of what “failed” or “failing” means, 
blame usually falls on poor and developing countries where weak institutions are 
endemic.14 The Failed States Index, an annual report created by the Fund for Peace, an 
independent research and educational organization, measures the general stability and 
conditions of 178 states, using social science methodologies to compile its data.15  The 
Fund has established twelve indicators that cover social, economic and political realities 
within the state.  They are: 1) demographic pressures, 2) the number of refugees and 
internally displaced persons, 3) the level of group grievance, 4) human flight and brain 
drain, 5) uneven economic development, 6) poverty and economic decline, 7) the strength 
of state legitimacy, 8) the ability to provide public services, 9) respect for human rights 
and rule of law, 10) strength of the security apparatus, 11) presence of factionalized 
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elites, and 12) whether external intervention has taken place.16  Since space does not 
permit a lengthy discussion of all the indicators, three main ones will be analyzed to 
explain why weak domestic institutions enable AIGs to continue to operate.   Of the 
twelve, I think these three indicators are the most effective, and comprehensive, ones that 
show how failing domestic institutions can facilitate the persistence of AIGs. 
The three indicators are poverty and economic decline, group grievances and the 
state’s security apparatus.  The Fund defines poverty and economic decline as the 
inability of the state to provide for its citizens, which is revealed in such national data as 
GDP (or Gross National Income per capita, GNI), government debt and poverty rates.  
For group grievance, the Fund measures the tension and violence between groups 
because of powerlessness, sectarian, and religious violence.  As for the state’s security 
apparatus, its control of the legitimate use of force is weakened by illegitimate uses of 
force, such as rebel activities, militancy, or riots.  For comparative purposes, I will also 
provide figures for Norway, which at number 175 is considered a “very stable” country 
on the Index.  Each of the original twelve indicators is measured from 1 to 10.  The 
higher the score, the worse the performance is.  Based on the total scores of all indicators, 
countries are defined as holding the status of “alert,” “warning,” or “stable.”   Any score 
higher than an 80 means that the state is in the “critical” category.  Therefore, countries 
that are considered stable, like Norway, would have very low scores on the indicators. 
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Table 4.1: Selected countries from the 2013 Failed States Index. 
Rank in 
Index 
Countries Poverty/ 
Economic 
Decline 
Group  
Grievance 
Security 
Apparatus 
 
Total (of 
all 12 
indicators) 
16 Nigeria 
(High Alert) 
7.5 9.8 9.5 100.7 
38 Mali  
(Very High 
Warning) 
 
8.1 7.6 8.1 89.3 
59 Philippines 
(High Warning) 
 
5.6 7.9 8.7 82.8 
Cf. 175 Norway 
(Sustainable) 
 
3.6 3.6 2.7 21.5 
Source: For more data, see http://ffp.statesindex.org/indicator 
 
Poverty and Economic decline 
This indicator measures a government’s ability to meet the economic needs of its 
citizens.  The population of Mali in 2011 was just over 15.8 million and the GNI per 
capita was $610.17  Mali is one of the twenty-five poorest countries in the world with half 
of the population living on less than $1.25 a day.18 This means that the national poverty 
rate is at 43 percent, with the poorest Malians residing in the central and northern areas.  
Malian ethnic groups are identified by their economic livelihoods; they live in 
enclaves in the north and northwest if they are pastoralists or herders, and along the Niger 
River and south as farmers. The early political leaders of the 1960s-70s adopted a 
socialist form of economic planning, which saw the government actively subsidizing and 
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seizing lands to promote an agricultural economy.19 Only 4 percent of the land is arable.  
As a result, tensions grew between traditional pastoralists and farmers.  The resulting 
economic policies displeased the already alienated Tuareg groups, mainly pastoralists, 
who had long engaged in low-level conflicts for separatist rights.  Over the years, the 
frequency of droughts in the Tuareg-populated northern areas and absence of 
governments’ intervention to preserve the Tuaregs’ economic livelihood forced them to 
either migrate to neighboring countries or live in refugee camps.20  Such flights, and the 
displacements caused by the 2012 conflict, have further deepened the economic misery of 
the Tuaregs.  This is revealed in the level of food insecurity that is present in the northern 
areas.  According to a World Food Programme report, “three out of four households … 
are food insecure and heavily dependent on food assistance … [and] [p]eople in the north 
are spending between 85 percent and 90 percent of their income on food. Around 1.3 
million will continue to need food assistance throughout 2013 and into 2014.” 21  In the 
absence of government intervention, the burden of providing basic necessities lies on 
international organizations.     
Unlike Mali, Nigeria is a resource rich country, but it has been plagued by socio-
political and economic problems since its independence in 1960.  Nigeria is important to 
US interests because it is the fifth largest oil exporter to the United States, providing 
about 9-11 percent of its crude oil imports.  It is also Africa’s biggest oil producer, and 
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has one of the largest gas reserves in the world.22  Its oil revenues provide 80 percent of 
the government’s income.23  A Bloomberg Report puts its 2010 total oil revenues at $59 
billion.24  Its 2012 GDP stands at US $262.6 billion and its GNI (per capita) is $1,430.25  
However, 54 percent of its 162 million people still live in poverty, or, understood another 
way, 80 percent of Nigerians live on less than $2 a day.26 Despite the generous oil 
revenues, Nigeria has had a difficult time reconciling incoming wealth with the dire 
poverty of most of its people.  It has repeatedly failed to address the social and economic 
needs of its people, as evident in its consistently low ranking in the Failed State Index.  
At number sixteen on the index, it is in the High Alert group with other countries like 
Somalia (number 1) and Iraq (number 11).   In fact, according to a BBC report, poverty is 
most evident in the northern areas, at 77.7 percent and 76.3 percent respectively, 
compared to the south, measured at 59.1 percent.27 
In the Philippines, American economic policies during colonial rule, which 
generally stifled national growth to protect American goods, were preserved in the post-
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colonial years.  Ownership was simply transferred to American allies.  This set the tone 
for later economic policies.  According to Julius Parrenas, the Philippines is a weak state 
“ marked by uneven economic development … [r]egional, social and ideological 
divisions … [d]isaffection over the central government’s neglect, and even separatism.”28   
One of the enabling factors in the Philippines’ economic decline is the large gap between 
the masses and socio-economic elites, a legacy of former Spanish and American 
influences.  The exclusive access of elites to power led to a pervasive system of 
patronage that has preserved the positions of the elites and their descendants to this day.  
An Al-Jazeera article noted that 178 family dynasties control 73 of the total 80 provinces 
in the Philippines.29 
This socio-political hierarchy affects economic policies and income distribution.  
Although the Filipino economy has seen some incremental growth in the past three years, 
this has done nothing to alleviate the poverty rates.30  In 2009, the Filipino government 
commissioned a report on poverty, which showed that 26.5 percent of the population had 
fallen below the poverty line.31  A 2012 World Bank report shows that around 41 percent 
of Filipinos live on less than $2 a day, and its GDP for that year was US $250.2 billion.32 
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The excluded masses are usually the landless and rural poor, who have turned to 
Communism and religion to deal with the social injustices.  The poorest areas are in the 
south, especially in the region of Mindanao, one of the major island groups, where the 
poverty rate is around 50 percent.33 The government has blamed the endemic poverty on 
continuing civil conflicts in the area.  However, aid organizations have cited a lack of 
government will to address the economic disparities as a major factor.34 Whatever the 
reason, the southern areas continue to provide ample recruitment opportunities for AIGs, 
as a representative of the European Commission to the Philippines noted: “…poverty, 
above religion and secessionism, is the root of the conflict.”35 
In sum, all three countries have a high poverty rate.  According to the World 
Bank, Mali’s 2010 poverty rate (people living on less than $1.25 a day) was measured at 
50.4 percent, Nigeria at 68 percent and the Philippines at 18.4 percent.36 These numbers 
would increase if the poverty rate included people living on less than $2 a day.   They 
also share an uneven economic development, which have benefited a small segment of 
the society.     
Group Grievance 
All three armed insurgent groups have their base in marginalized and 
disenfranchised sectors of the population. The Tuaregs in Mali, who have latched on to 
the AQIM movement, have participated in previous rebellions against the Malian  
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government, which were usually met with repressive measures.  Their traditionally held 
   
   Source: BBC 
areas were integrated into five neighboring countries during French colonial rule (see 
Map 4.5).  Tuaregs have been fighting for self-determination long before Mali gained its 
independence.  Constituting only 10 percent of the population, they are mostly 
pastoralists, which pits them against farmers and other non-Tuareg groups in conflicts 
over the rights to grazing land.  Since the government invests more on the cultivable 
areas around the Niger river, the drier north is left to fend for itself.  Residents in the 
north also have to deal with the recurring problems of famines and droughts, without 
much government assistance.  According to a Minorities at Risk Report (MARP), the 
Map 4.5: Tuareg-populated areas in West Africa.                                                
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government seems “unwilling or unable to implement necessary development and 
educational projects to alleviate Tuareg marginalization and poverty.”37   
Ideally, Tuaregs would like to preserve their culture and land rights, and maintain 
their long-standing traditional way of life as nomads.  While their “underlying grievances 
… [may seem] … economic and cultural,” they are also politically disenfranchised 
because of the geographical fragmentation of their people.38  Tuaregs have had to move 
or relocate to other areas, and other countries, in order to improve their living standards.   
Another factor that may explain Tuaregs’ marginalization is the perception that they are 
ethnically distinct from the Black Africans that constitute a majority of the Malian 
population.  Tuaregs are considered fair-skinned “Arabs,” (actually a Berber sub-group) 
and have their own customs, including their language, Tamasheq, all of which reinforce 
inter-group conflicts.  Mali hosts numerous ethnic groups, and since independence, the 
Tuaregs have never enjoyed a position of prestige. 
While the Tuaregs continue their struggle for self-determination,  Boko Haram 
has placed itself as the “savior” of the marginalized Nigerian Muslims.  Nigeria is a 
democracy (incomplete to some), but it has yet to build a strong sense of national 
identity.  The internal dissensions among the many ethnic groups continue to impede the 
civilian government’s efforts to establish stability.  Boko Haram sees itself as a Muslim 
militant group fighting against a corrupt Christian government, generating a political 
narrative using religious memes.  This “religious conflict” has helped to legitimize Boko 
Haram’s role in defending Muslims against the Christians.  Both the economic and 
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political power have traditionally lain in the hands of Christians, and the worsening 
conditions of the poorest regions in the north have convinced BH that they are fighting a 
“jihad” against the government to erase the injustices suffered by Muslims.   
When group grievances arise as a reaction to perceived injustices, poverty or 
limited economic opportunities are enough to fuel insurgencies.  In the previous section, 
the poverty rate in the Muslim north, where people largely depend on subsistence 
farming, was noted as being over 70 percent.  Nigeria’s rural poor in the northern states 
must bear the effects of very limited access to healthcare, education, electricity and water 
supply since cities are prioritized in terms of investments in these services.39  Borno, and 
its capital of Maiduguri, is an example of a neglected state.  According to the Economist, 
Borno is one of the most “mismanaged states” where people must learn to live with 
increasing food prices, high illiteracy rates, late salaries, random curfews and searches.40 
The Philippine situation is similar to that of Muslims in Nigeria.  Over the 
decades, they have engaged in many insurgencies on behalf of agrarian rights.  The 
multitude of ethno-linguistic groups that make up the Philippines has led to the creation 
of geographical boundaries, which separate ethnic communities.  This, in turn, presents a 
challenge to national integration.41  There are about eight main ethno-linguistic groups 
(about 86 percent of the population) that occupy the northern areas and are predominantly 
Christians (92 percent).  Muslims, mostly residing in the southern areas of Sulu and 
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Mindanao, make up six percent of the population.   Most Filipino Muslims reside within 
five southern provinces known as the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao 
(ARMM), but, according to McKenna, it has “severely constrained resources and very 
limited political autonomy.”42  He notes that the ARMM region is the most neglected 
area in the south, as seen in its high rates of illiteracy, corruption, infant mortality, and 
poverty, to name a few.43 
To compound the situation, the Filipino government had also tried to reduce 
Muslim control in the south as early as the 1950s.  Leaders held a “colonial” mentality 
that they were responsible for civilizing the “backward” Muslims, and that they needed to 
integrate them into society.44  As a result, they settled Christians in the Muslim-
dominated areas of Moro in Mindanao and Sulu.  Soon after, a competition over land 
began since the Christian immigrants were granted land titles.  Muslims were sometimes 
forcibly dispossessed of their lands by Christian settlers, with the help of government 
forces.45 This, inevitably, left an indelible impression that the state was threatening 
Muslim local rights and identity.   McKenna thinks the gradual loss of Muslim 
“homeland” has motivated insurgents, along with thousands of local supporters, to fight 
for their “cultural, economic, and political self-determination.”46  
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Strength of the Security Apparatus 
The default response by the state to any potential conflict or tension is the use of 
force, of which it has legitimate use.  However, according to the 2013 Failed States 
Index, the social contract that legitimizes the use of force is weakened when the state is 
challenged by competing groups.47   Against all three AIGs, the state has waged many 
organized military campaigns to eradicate these movements, but none have succeeded so 
far.  In a word, the strength (i.e. effectiveness) of the security apparatus reflects the 
state’s ability, or inability, to contain its domestic conflicts.  Of the three indicators on the 
2012 Failed States index, all three countries scored over 8.0 points out of a total of 10.0 
in the category of security apparatus, which means that their security status is “critical.”  
The strength of the security apparatus determines the ability of the state to effectively 
control its affairs. 
Mali has generally struggled since its independence in 1960 to achieve political 
stability.  Decades of political corruption and military dictatorships, economic instability 
and ethnic conflicts all impeded the creation of a strong security apparatus. The political 
chaos following the 2012 military coup almost led to a Tuareg and AQIM-led takeover of 
the capital. The Malian government had to ask for French military intervention to avoid 
any advancement of the Islamists into Bamako.  In July 2013, democratic elections began 
a new period in Malian politics, resulting in a tentative truce between the government and 
the Tuareg separatists, but this “remains fragile.”48 It will take time for this new 
government to establish itself before it could confront AQIM, definitively.  As of now, 
according to an Economist article, “[n]one of the ECOWAS’s members has the logistics 
                                                            
47	  “2013	  Failed	  States	  Index,”	  http://ffp.statesindex.org/indicators	  
	  
48	  “Mali	  Profile,”	  accessed	  Nov.	  11,	  2013,	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐africa-­‐13881370	  
	  
	  
60	  
and intelligence to retake a large territory” and so Mali may have to consider better 
trained foreign troops as an option to end this conflict.49   
In Nigeria, the civil unrest has complicated the government’s ability to maintain 
stability.  Nigeria’s score of  9.5 out of 10 points in the category of security apparatus 
(compared to Norway’s 2.7) gives it the status of “High Alert.”  Of the three countries, 
Nigeria’s level of insecurity is the highest.  Compounding the security crisis, the state’s 
security forces have been known to be “indiscriminate in their fight against Boko Haram, 
often killing innocent civilians.”50  This level of disproportionate violence has deepened 
existing communal conflicts between Christians and Muslims, which is a “permanent 
feature of rural Nigeria.”51  The level of ongoing violence in northern Nigeria 
demonstrates the incapacity of the government to manage its internal security problems, 
leaving civilians at the mercy of insurgents.  This could get even worse if BH decides to 
coordinate with other insurgent groups in neighboring countries.  In fact, as one news 
article claims, BH may be sharing tactics with other militant groups, such as Al-Shabaab 
of Somalia.52 
Thus far, both the army and police are unable to destroy the movement.  Even 
with additional security forces deployed in the state of Borno, Boko Haram is using 
“urban guerilla warfare” to effectively compromise the army’s position, demonstrating its 
skills in conducting a civil conflict in closed spaces within a populated city.  Its 
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confidence in using Maiduguri as a jumping-off point is reflected in a March 2013 attack 
against an army base 125 miles from Maiduguri, signaling an intent to extend its radius of 
operations beyond the borders of the city.53     
In the Philippines, the strength of the government’s security apparatus is a poor 
8.7, second to Nigeria’s, which puts it in the “Very High Warning” category.  Twenty 
years after its establishment in 1991, ASG is still presenting a challenge to the 
government.  In spite of heavy-handed tactics against this group, and despite U.S. 
assistance, the state is failing to manage the conflict.  Through compromises and 
agreements, the government was able to “control” MNLF and MILF, the two more 
organized separatist groups.  But, meanwhile, ASG has been moving around the country 
with impunity, including neighboring countries, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.  
Since 2002, the U.S. has been providing substantial military assistance to the Philippines 
as part of its global war on terror.  According to one source, in 2002, the U.S. government 
provided over $100 million worth of mainly military hardware, including helicopters, 
night vision devices, M16 rifles, and heat sensing and electronic monitoring equipment.54 
Even with the increased military technology, the Filipino security forces have not been 
able to totally eradicate ASG, and the security situation between the two sides remains at 
a stalemate. 
To extend its influence, ASG has been forging alliances with both MILF (which 
signed an agreement with the government in October 2012, which has not been 
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formalized), and Jemaat Islamiyah (JI, an Indonesia-based separatist group), which was 
responsible for the Bali bomb attack in 2002 that killed around 200 people.55  JI has been 
known to train with ASG in both Jolo and Basilan islands.56  Besides warring with the 
state, ASG is also conducting a parallel campaign against civilians.  Some claim that 
ASG is nothing more than a bandit group that is “victimizing locals and foreigners alike” 
and is involved in frequent kidnappings to finance its operations.57  Despite the state’s 
military counter-measures against AIGs, and international support, there is no sign of a 
letting up on both sides.   
	  	  	  	   
Local Support 
 Both ungoverned spaces and weak domestic institutions are contributing factors to 
the resilience of AIGs.     However, even if a group is successful in implanting itself 
within a community or space, it cannot continue its operations effectively without 
establishing a local network of support.  A state’s legitimacy is derived from the 
recognition of its citizens; likewise, a resistance movement needs, especially in its 
formative years, similar support and recognition.  AIGs manipulate local support systems 
to advance their causes, and movements.  For example they rely on ethnic and communal 
ties to ensure loyalty, and have replaced the state in their ungoverned spaces by providing 
basic services, such as food subsidies, healthcare and education.    
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Ethnic and communal ties 
Although AQIM was created by nationalist Algerians returning from fighting in 
the 1980s Russo-Afghan war, it operates from within the cultural and geographic space of 
the Tuaregs.  After a military and political backlash from the Algerian government, 
members of AQIM transplanted themselves to Mali, settling among their Tuareg 
supporters.  It is not certain whether AQIM made a calculated decision to incorporate the 
Tuareg grievances into their own Islamist cause in order to find a “safe haven.”  The two 
groups are, however, not distinct from each other.  Tribal and kinship ties play important 
roles in building alliances, and both Algerians and Tuaregs share common traditions and 
customs.  Thus, the decision of AQIM to “attach” itself to Tuaregs’ grievances against 
the state seems to not be a far-fetched one.  It would have been difficult to otherwise 
locate another space since neighboring countries such as Libya, Egypt and Tunisia, were 
undergoing transitional political periods, and other countries such as Morocco and 
Algeria, would not hesitate to use repressive measures to stamp out any insurgency.  
  Uniting with disenfranchised Tuaregs, who have been engaged periodically in 
conflicts with the Malian government over ethno-political rights, thus seemed opportune 
for AQIM.  Strategically, the areas that AQIM chose to settle are generally poor Tuareg-
dominated areas in the north that are physically inaccessible, and cannot be easily 
penetrated by security forces.  A 2011 UN mission noted that AQIM is able to find 
“accommodation with local communities” where the “humanitarian vacuum is being 
filled by AQIM and/or criminal elements who are reportedly providing services and 
humanitarian assistance in remote areas where State [sic]  presence is reduced or non-
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existent.”58  This kind of service could assist the AQIM’s efforts to recruit, and enlist 
locals to gather information, supply arms and other logistics.59  A strategy used by AQIM 
to integrate themselves into local communities is intermarriages between clans or tribes.  
For example, Mokthan Bel-mokhtar, an Algerian AQIM leader, married the daughter of a 
Tuareg chief, which helped consolidate and strengthen alliances.60 Another strategy that 
AQIM uses is publicly uniting with locals in condemning the government’s ineffective 
policies, thus casting itself as a “protector” of the people.    
Proof of AQIM’s goal to ensure local support in order to make their movement 
more successful was revealed in a letter written in July 2012 by its leader, Abdelmalek 
Droukdel.  In it, he suggests that AQIM can maintain its operations in Mali only if it 
“gain[s] a region under control and a people fighting for us and a refuge for our members 
that allows us to move forward with our program.”61  Droukdel understood that 
repressive policies would alienate supporters rather than mobilize them, and he voiced his 
disapproval of certain policies adopted by his allies such as Ansar al-Din, which 
advocates a more extreme form of Islamism in Mali.  Droukdel thinks this attitude could 
alienate AQIM’s efforts to expand and remain relevant.62 Clearly, the goal is not to adopt 
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heavy-handed measures that would alienate the state and local population.  In his letter, 
Droukdel called for “co-opting local grievances … [and] adopt[ing] a flexible strategy of 
alliances … [with] various sectors and parts of Azawad society – Arabs and Tuaregs and 
Zingiya [Blacks].”63 In sum, the letter acknowledges that forming convenient alliances 
with disparate local groups is necessary to the success of a movement.  After all, if 
AQIM’s goals are to create a global jihad then its leadership must mobilize enough 
support and alliances to counter local, regional and international resistance.  
Similarly, Boko Haram in Nigeria recognizes the importance of having a popular 
base within a space where local Muslims and insurgent groups were, and still are, united 
in their grievances against the state.  One of the biggest grievances that BH shares with 
its local supporters is the level of police brutality, which includes murder, sometimes of 
innocent civilians.64   The state has been known to carry out extrajudicial killings, torture 
and arbitrary arrests of anyone suspected of “terrorism.”65  Another factor that unites 
Muslims in a common cause against the Christian state and Christian followers is a 
sectarian one.  Because BH claims to be fighting for disenfranchised Muslims, they may 
have garnered civilian sympathizers.  The logistics behind large-scale attacks against 
Christian civilians and churches, according to a Nigerian criminal justice representative, 
could only be done with “local support and collaboration.”66 Although BH has publicly 
stated its goal, which is to institute an Islamic state in Nigeria, experts are debating 
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whether it is more intent on expanding the war against Christians than bringing attention 
to the plight of Muslims in the North.67  Communal conflicts reinforce the in-group 
identity of Muslims, providing tacit support for Boko Haram operations.  Using the high 
poverty levels among Muslims, BH is hoping to create a sharp ideo-political divide 
between itself and a corrupt Christian government.   BH has repeatedly been vocal about 
government neglect of the northern areas, portraying itself as a fighter against poverty, 
bad governance and corruption.   
A similar phenomenon is taking place in the Philippines where a separatist 
Muslim AIG is fighting against a largely Catholic government.  ASG has survived 
against thirteen years of government’s military campaigns.  During periods of inactivity, 
ASG goes underground when there are large-scale incursions by the governments, and 
then reappears later.  An important factor fueling its comebacks is local support, which, 
in the initial years, allowed it to expand its base into new territories.68 The southern 
islands contain the 15 poorest provinces of the Philippines, and have witnessed years of 
military incursions and abuses, landlessness, and general government neglect.69   
The ability of ASG to implant itself in areas having similar ethno-linguistic ties, 
shows how it is adapting to its environment.  This may explain why the Filipino 
government is failing to penetrate these areas after more than two decades.  The cultural 
bonds that ASG has to the locals are based on a complex web of alliances shaped by 
clans, ancestral ties, religion and ethno-linguistic relationships.  An Australian 
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intelligence reports claims that ASG could have as many as twenty-six clan groupings 
within its fold, which provide most of the local support base.70  Clans generally have their 
own clan leaders, as dictated by custom.  Thus, ASG adapts to its environment by 
blending in with other locals, and these “close ties and anonymity help to account for 
these groups’ longevity.”71   
Receiving and maintaining local support is not automatic, and as shown in the 
cases of these groups, this requires not only time, but also steps to ensure that support 
continues.  In some cases, where there is a strong sense of in-group identity, it becomes 
relatively easy.  In all three cases, there are shared cultural traditions, reinforced by 
common grievances.  Insurgent groups will use both to further their goals, but they also 
must look for ways to legitimize their goals, without alienating supporters with the use of 
terror tactics.  As elaborated in the next section, an AIG’s decision to become either a 
“charity” social institution or a “protector” of locals’ rights against the government, or 
both, helps explain why forming a nexus with the local population is necessary to its 
survival.  
 
Provision of Social Services  
AIGs frequently point to poor governance, such as inadequate social and health 
care services and educational opportunities, as a major reason for engaging in armed 
conflict against the government.  Integrating themselves into local communities requires 
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more than just having similar ethnic and communal ties.  The impact of AQIM on 
domestic stability in Mali is yet to be determined, as they are relative newcomers to the 
international scene.  Therefore, there are not enough reports outlining its charity schemes 
among the Tuaregs.  There is no question, however, that it is attempting to strengthen 
alliances with the indigenous Tuaregs.  One of the strategies AQIM uses is to funnel 
monies from illegal activities such as drug trafficking, smuggling and kidnapping for 
ransoms, to the people.  These ventures have not only generated much income to finance 
AQIM’s operations, but they have also provided “income and job opportunities for 
communities and individuals in the region.”72  An Africa Security Report claims that 
AQIM has been hiring “local bandits and rebels” in nearby regions, while local Tuaregs 
are being pushed into “the arms of AQIM” because of limited economic opportunities.73  
An estimate of its criminal wealth, according to the Africa Security report, is around $70 
million, resulting from kidnappings alone between 2006 and 2011, and excluding 
revenues from illicit drug trafficking.74 
 The same can be said for Boko Haram, which has replaced, for now, the 
government’s role in the north.  Very early on, it made a symbolic move by choosing to 
build a mosque in the city of Maiduguri as its headquarters.  This was just after the 
security forces killed BH founder, Mohammed Ali, in December 2003.  During the 
following five years BH regrouped, and entrenched itself in the community, building its 
reputation as a charity service, by providing food and subsidies.75  Establishing itself as 
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an “institution” for the people not only reinforced its position there, but also strengthened 
its ties with the local inhabitants.  As noted earlier, the conditions of Muslims in the north 
provide another reason to support BH.  Even so, some say that BH has been “terrorizing” 
local residents into supporting them, rather than providing needy services such as food 
and health care services, according to a New York Times article.76 Although this has not 
been confirmed elsewhere, “forcing” locals to become supporters deviates from how 
AQIM and ASG establish their local support systems.  Such a method reveals that shared 
cultural practices and grievances may not be enough to convince locals to become willing 
participants in insurgent movement, as BH is finding out.  
As seen with the two previous case studies, socio-political needs and cultural 
disaffection are the root causes of most grievances, providing a convenient platform for 
the AIGs to use.  The Abu Sayyaf Group has been able to manipulate these grievances by 
subscribing to the community ideal within Islam.  The role of the community or umma 
plays an important role in Islam because it, not the individual, upholds the values of 
Islam, which, in turn, benefit the larger society.  Measures to preserve the community 
ideal include charities to provide welfare services, health care, and education.   These 
charities serve the dual function of actual charity giving and centers for recruiting, 
fundraising, arms dealing and other illicit activities, which were part of the ASGs’ 
policies.77  So, in a word, these services are magnanimous, but they also preserve ASG’s 
presence.    
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Most of ASG’s wealth comes from its ransoms from kidnappings, and has 
generally been used to strengthen familial ties.  Ransoms from ASG’s kidnappings have 
not only paid for weapons, but also to support group members in exchange for 
cooperation.78  Securing familial ties has been a way to ensure that Abu Sayyaf is always 
surrounded by loyal and trustworthy supporters.  Groups benefitting from these services 
are determined by their ethno-linguistic affiliations, which potentially could thwart any 
government efforts to infiltrate them.79    To guarantee long-lasting loyalty, ASG relies on 
familial ties, and, in fact, “most members are relatives, friends, classmates, and 
neighborhood associates.”80   
While the provision of local services may boost the status of AIGs within local 
communities, there is an ideological solidarity that local supporters share with regard to 
the alleged goals that AIGs claim to pursue.  Ideology drives the emotional zeal that 
binds followers to each other, and to the cause behind the movement.  The next chapter 
will briefly look at two older AIGs in order to support the thesis that the same indicators 
– ungoverned spaces, weak domestic institutions and local support – were just as 
applicable to AIGs that existed in the past, and which had a high rate of survival.  The 
comparison should strengthen the case I am making that these three factors are extremely 
central to AIG longevity.   
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Chapter 5 
Duration of Past Armed Insurgent Groups (AIGs) 
The nature of insurgencies generally reflects the types of changes and experiences 
within the state, and their messages are expressed strategically in language bytes – 
whether framed by religion, nationalism, communism, or other emotionally-charged 
ideologies.  Once there is a public consensus on perceived grievances, AIGs are quickly 
born.  Although this thesis set out to identify three conditions that help to prolong the 
lives of AIGs in the twenty-first century, this section will show that these indicators carry 
equal weight in explaining the longevity of earlier insurgent movements.  It will look at 
two AIGs located in different parts of the world.  Both Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path 
of Peru) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam  (LTTE of Sri Lanka) used geographic 
spaces and local connections to maintain a presence in their respective “weak” countries 
for more than twenty years before brutal use of military force ended their movements.  
Sendero Luminoso (SL) 
During the Cold War period, the spread of Communism, anarchism and Maoist 
sentiments was an effective organizing principle for many groups.  The Shining Path in 
Peru (or Sendero Luminoso) subscribed to a Maoist-influenced form of Communism.  
Although its ideological and organizational foundations began in the 1960s, the group 
started its campaign against the new civilian government in 1980.  After nearly 15 years, 
they left billions of dollars worth of destruction, and more than 25,000 deaths. 1  Its 
revolutionary vision was to reform the Peruvian government by removing all traces of 
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foreign influences, and to eventually replace the government with an indigenous form of 
“Peruvian democracy.”   
There was a sense of “militant, revolutionary commitment to a long-term and very 
disciplined approach” that sustained the movement until it petered out in the early 1990s 
with the capture of its figurehead, Abimael Guzman.2  It has been mentioned that SL is 
still operational in some areas in Peru, and has a membership of around 200 to 300 armed 
militants.3  It is now protecting narco-trafficking routes across Peru to acquire funds to 
revive SL.4    
Map 5.1: Map shows increasing influences of Sendero Luminioso during 1981-90. 
 
 Source: http://www.galeon.com 
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However, its early success during the 1980s as an AIG was due to similar indicators that 
are benefitting present day AIGs, including their operations in ungoverned spaces, the 
presence of local support systems, and the “failing” social institutions of the state.     
SL was successful in operating from within rural areas, manipulating 
geographical isolation to create a “full-fledged, territorial-based insurgent state … [and] 
imposing territorial units and structures of governance.”5  One of its effective strategies  
was to infiltrate new zones or regions by gradually taking over local power centers 
through targeted assassinations (see Map 5.1).  Local SL cells were established to 
become the power centers in these areas.  Thus SL was able to consolidate its political 
power over its increasing territorial spaces. By the end of 1993, SL was present in 114 
provinces, including the areas that grow coca leaves, which produce 60 percent of the 
world’s supply of cocaine.6   This group deliberately sought refuge in areas close to the 
Andes known as the puna, or areas above 4,000 meters.7  Such areas offered SL ready 
access to populated areas below, major highways and rainforests, which were generally 
isolated and inaccessible to government forces.  Government and military forces 
occupied the coastal areas and large cities.    
SL claimed to be fighting a “people’s war” so it wanted to discredit government 
institutions.  It wanted to create a wedge of distrust between the government and the 
people.  It destroyed government buildings, assassinated officials, and targeted the 
country’s infrastructure such as the electric company.  This was to establish a de facto 
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authority in its acquired territories.  Indiscriminate violence against both officials and 
civilians was deliberate, and the terror campaign to elicit fear, loyalty and compliance 
proved successful to maintaining SL’s momentum.  SL’s decade long military conflict 
against government forces showed the weakness of the state’s security apparatus to 
effectively contain any domestic insurgencies. 
To make matters worse, Peru’s ongoing economic crisis during the 1980s, due to 
mismanagement after more than 20 years of military rule, pushed the country into a debt 
crisis and hyperinflation.  Land reforms proved inadequate to ease the poverty of the 
majority of Peruvians, who were poor farmers, reliant on agriculture for their source of 
income.  They lacked the skills and technology to compete with large landowners.  New 
laissez-faire economic policies favored the local elites, which eventually led to a stark 
socio-economic inequality.   To correct this inbalance, the government sought to borrow 
money from international banks, notably the IMF, which led to a debt crisis.  According 
to Carlos Gomez, in the early 1980s, “the amount of borrowing amounted to more than 
473 million dollars, yet the infrastructure was still weak.”8  He continued on to say that a 
symptom of the government’s weak institutions was the “126 deaths for every 1000 
infants born due to inadequate medical facilities.” 9  In sum, living conditions of majority 
of Peruvians continued to deteriorate, and by the early 1990s, “inflation had increased 
more than 7,000% and per capita GDP decreased to 1,908 (down from 2,643 in 1987!).”10 
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As SL was based in rural areas, it actively sought the support of the mostly 
peasant communities that reside in the valley areas, which were the main bases of 
operations.   SL employed a series of strategies to gain local support, either through 
violence and intimidation or as “protectors” of the peasants against the alleged tyranny of 
large landowners and government officials.  Herein lies a clear similarity between SL and 
Boko Haram.  Both AIGs sought to “terrorize” locals into supporting their cause, 
resulting in local residents becoming cautious and reluctant to join the movements.  
Land ownership was a prickly issue between poor peasants and the government, 
and SL coopted locals’ grievances by claiming to be their advocates.  In other areas, 
mostly in the upper Huallaga Valley in northern Peru, a majority of the coca growers 
were peasant farmers.  In order to protect this lucrative business, SL entered “into a 
patron-client relationship … [to] defend the interests of peasants.”11  As a result, SL 
became a de facto protector of peasant farmers against the government’s coca eradication 
schemes and other corrupt officials who sought to exploit coca growers.  SL’s stratagems 
of selective intimidation and quasi-protector role contributed to its continuing presence 
among the civilian population.  
Similar factors also informed the movement of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka.  
The following section will show how operational bases in a distant geographic space, 
local support and “weak” institutions also sustained the rise of this AIG. 
 
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
 The LTTE was a separatist group, formed in the 1970s, that fought from the 
1980s to 2000s to establish a Tamil state (or eelam) in north Sri Lanka.  This movement 
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lasted around twenty-six years until it signed a peace agreement with the Sri Lankan 
government in 2009.  At one point LTTE controlled about a quarter of Sri Lanka, had an 
army of 20,000 soldiers, and was equipped with an impressive array of military 
equipment that included speedboats and submarine capabilities.12   LTTE’s armed 
conflict began in 1983 already with “superior discipline and commitment to creating 
eelam.”13   
LTTE shared many characteristics with SL in its organizational and strategic 
aspects.  However, whereas SL had to continually fight to gain local support, LTTE 
leadership could rely on shared ethno-linguistic and cultural traditions that dominate in 
the generally Tamil-concentrated north.  Similarly to SL, the three indicators that 
sustained its militant movement were the consolidation of territorial spaces conveniently 
located away from the capital, “weak” social institutions that facilitated a prolonged civil 
war, and connections to local supporters, who, mainly, provided ready recruits for its 
army. 
LTTE’s controlled mainly the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka, but its 
de facto capital was the northern city of Kilinochchi, which was around 330 KM from Sri 
Lanka’s capital, Colombo.  It operated a military base out of the jungle area of the 
northeastern district of Mullaitivu, which saw the last battle between Sri Lankan forces 
and the Tamil Tigers that eventually ended the 25-year civil war in 2009.  From 
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Map 5.2: Main conflict areas in the LTTE-controlled areas.                            
	  
     Source: BBC.com	  
1996 to 2009, LTTE experimented with statehood by creating courts, a tax collection 
system, government administrative offices, and television and radio broadcasting stations 
in its nominal capital, Kilinochchi.14 Then in 2000, it wrestled control of the strategic 
Elephant Pass (see Map), consolidating LTTE’s presence in the north with the additional 
control of the Jaffna Peninsula, and the main transportation routes.  It was only in early 
2009 that LTTE’s power began to wane after the loss of Kilinochchi, and subsequent 
military defeats.   However, for more than thirty years, its influence in the northern areas 
generally remained undisturbed so it was able to become an effective fighting force with 
political ambitions.  The relative strength or weakness of the Sri Lankan state also 
facilitated the AIG’s continuity. 
 Sri Lanka, like Peru, relied largely on an agricultural-based economy.  Distrust of 
industrial and capital-based economies was common, and a state-controlled economy led 
to economic policies that resulted in low GDP rates, high unemployment, especially in 
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  accessed	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rural areas, and lower standards of living.  The “overall effect was a virtual collapse of 
the economy in the mid-1970s.” 15  Eventually, Sri Lanka had to receive assistance from 
the World Bank and the IMF through the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) that 
allegedly reformed the financial sectors, and restructured the government budget.  
However, a Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 1999 Report acknowledged that 
the SAP may not have considered “the efficacy of the process towards the development 
programmes, poverty alleviation, employment generation and rural development as a 
whole.”16  During the 1970s and 1980s, poverty rates, income disparities, consumer 
prices and unemployment grew exponentially.  GNI per capita from 1985 to 2000 
roughly held at between US $380--$860.17   
Although the strength of domestic institutions, determined by the government’s 
ability to provide crucial social services, is used as an indicator for failed and failing 
states on the Failed States Index, it should be noted that both Peru and Sri Lanka did 
attempt to implement far-reaching social and economic reforms in the pre-insurgent 
years.  Between the 1940s and 1970s, Sri Lanka spent much of its revenues on three 
social programs: health, education, and food subsidies. Peru opened its economy to 
foreign investments and privatizations of certain industries, such as mining, and also 
attempted land reforms to redistribute land rights to poor peasants.  At one point, it 
experienced one of the highest economic growths, between 1950 and 1965 because of its 
                                                            
15	  FAO	  Report	  on	  Sri	  Lanka,	  accessed	  Oct.	  25,	  2013,	  
http://www.fao.org/docrep/004/ac158e/ac158e0g.htm	  	  
	  
16	  1999	  FAO	  Report	  on	  Sri	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  GNI	  in	  Sri	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  Accessed	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exports and foreign investments.18 However, in both countries, the costs of maintaining 
social and economic reforms proved too costly, leading to heavy borrowing, which then 
created a debt crisis.  
 As a result, the poorest groups in both countries suffered the effects of 
deteriorating socio-economic conditions.  In Peru, it was the rural peasants, and in Sri 
Lanka, it was the Tamils.  A majority of the 2 million Sri Lankan Tamils live in the north 
(44 percent) and the east (28 percent), where they worked the tea and coffee plantations 
since the mid-19th century.  In the post-independence period, political policies that 
emphasized ethnic differences ensured poor governance and general neglect in the 
northeastern areas.  According to a 2012 Human Development Report, Tamils were 
“[t]rapped  in generational, long-term poverty, due to historical circumstances and a 
variety of other factors relating to geography, language and access to services, [and] they 
have poor health and education outcomes relative to the rest of the country.”19  The civil 
war did nothing to mitigate their situation either.     
It is important to see how electoral politics can provoke a civil war.  In the 
decades following Sri Lanka’s 1948 independence from Great Britain, the Sinhalese 
Buddhist government instituted far-reaching policies to ostracize the Hindu Tamils, such 
as adopting Sinhala-based curricula in schools and favoring the religious status of 
Buddhism over Hinduism.   Post-independence electoral politics used “religion" as a 
reason to mobilize support along ethnic and party lines.  The politicization of religious 
and cultural identities further alienated Tamils from the state, and by the early 1980s, set 
                                                            
18	  “Peru:	  Markets,	  Government	  and	  the	  Sources	  of	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http://lacea.org/WEB/country_studies/peru.pdf	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  accessed	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a tone for potential civil war.  A riot in 1983 marked the beginning of a Tamil diaspora, 
and the expansion of the LTTE movement.  According to DeVotta, “… rebel groups that 
numbered one or two score became hundreds strong.  Sri Lanka’s civil war had begun.”20      
   Like SL, LTTE claimed that they were saving the people from oppressors.  Both 
AIGs pursued a path to legitimize their role and discredit the sitting government.  
Assuming the role of “protector” or “savior” provided a convenient rationale for AIG 
leaders in the earlier and later insurgent movements.  Maintaining local support was 
necessary to consolidating territorial bases for both organizations.  LTTE established 
itself in parts of the north (Jaffna was the main city) and the east, traditionally a 
predominant Tamil area.  It created a parallel de facto government, complete with its own 
judicial courts, health and education boards in the city of Kilinochchi.  The aim was to 
create “institutions geared towards the welfare of the civilian population and the 
economic development of Tamil Eelam … committed to the rights, welfare and 
development of the Tamil community on whose behalf the militant and political struggles 
have been waged.”21  Without strong local support, LTTE would not have been able to 
attract adherents to its movement, which at one point swelled its ranks to 20,000 
fighters.22   When attacked, LTTE retreated into the civilian ranks, which served at times 
as “human shields.”   In fact, this strategy of operating from within civilian areas 
“discouraged LTTE leaders from escaping into surrounding jungles and reverting to 
                                                            
20	  DeVotta,	  p.	  1028.	  	  
	  
21	  Kristian	  Stokke,	  “Building	  the	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  State:	  Emerging	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  Institutions	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  of	  Governance	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guerrilla warfare,” which eventually led to their downfall.23  The ruthless counter-
insurgency measures of the then president Rajapaksa government targeted civilian areas 
in 2009, killing between 10,000-30,000 civilians in order to contain LTTE, forcing them 
to agree to a ceasefire.24   
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  Ibid.,	  p.	  1045.	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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 This thesis argues that armed insurgent groups (AIGs) persist in their host 
countries because of three conditions: ungoverned spaces, weak domestic institutions that 
fail to deliver public goods such as economic development and security, and local support 
networks.  Three AIGs were selected from different geographical regions to see whether 
these conditions have had a similar impact on the longevity of AIGs.  The groups are al-
Qaeda of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) of Mali, Boko Haram (BH) of Nigeria, and Abu 
Sayyaf (ASG) of the Philippines.   This paper also looked at two older AIGs, Sendero 
Luminoso (SL) of Peru and the Liberation Tigers of Sri Lanka (LTTE), to see whether 
these indicators are equally valid across time and locations.      
Each of the three indicators was subdivided into categories in order to show how 
AIGs are exploiting these interrelated factors that figure prominently in relatively weak 
states.  “Ungoverned spaces” covers general topography of the land, distance between 
seat of government and the AIG’s operational base, and the porous borders that exist 
between and among neighboring states.  It also covers “non-physical” ungoverned areas, 
but this was not included in the analysis of the indicators.  According to my research, 
although the three AIGs conform to these categories, a difference should be pointed out 
in the case of Boko Haram.  Both AQIM and ASG are located in difficult and isolated 
terrain that impedes swift government crackdowns.  BH is based within the city of 
Maiduguri where it is still able to wage an effective and long military campaign against 
government forces because Maiduguri is not governed effectively.  In fact, BH is now 
raising the level of their game, by operating outside their main base of Maiduguri in the 
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state of Borno.  In September 2013, BH attacked a college dorm in Yobe state, killing 
around 50 students.1  In response, the Nigerian military attacked BH’s Maiduguri base on 
October 25, 2013, killing around 74 members.2  This tells us that AIGs do not necessarily 
have to operate in geographic isolation.  Rather, ungoverned spaces can be “closed 
spaces,” like the city of Maiduguri, where there is no fear of government intervention. 
 The second indicator looks at how weak domestic institutions facilitate the 
longevity of AIGs, because governments are unable to combat poverty and economic 
decline, group grievances and recurring conflicts.  Using the information from the 2013 
Failed States Index, an annual report, the thesis shows that the three host countries did 
not meet the requirements for stable domestic institutions.  Poverty and group grievances 
were consistently present in the three countries, but the effectiveness of the security 
apparatus varies.  Of the three, rich Nigeria has the strongest security forces in numbers 
and weapons, but has the worst ranking in terms of insecurity (9.5 out of a total of 10 
points).   Besides having to deal with high levels of domestic crime, Nigeria’s forces 
must contend with BH, which continues to outwit the security forces.  Brutal government 
crackdowns have proven to be counter-productive.    
The third indicator is the local support system, which is similar to a quasi social 
contract between AIGs and the local civilian population.  By exploiting the socio-
economic grievances of local people, the AIGs can legitimize their roles, and further their 
interests, within the community.  This indicator includes both the categories of ethnic and 
communal ties that bind the two sides, and the social services that AIGs provide to their 
                                                            
1	  “Nigeria	  attack:	  Students	  shot	  dead	  as	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  accessed,	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  “UPDATE	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  accessed	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supporters.  Without question, this “contract” is positively reinforced by shared cultural 
traditions in the case of AQIM, ASG and LTTE, but there is one caveat.  In the case of 
BH, where both locals and BH members share a bond as Muslims, BH has been “forcing” 
people into supporting them, killing innocent people randomly.  As a result, this has led 
to the creation of civilian vigilante groups in Muslim northeastern Nigeria, where BH 
operates.  So, despite similar traditions and grievances, locals are not “buying into” BH’s 
messages.  Like BH, Sendero Luminoso sometimes had to coerce people into becoming 
supporters with the result that they actually lost support.  In the other cases considered, 
however, it was not force but rather the “common bonds” and the provision of social 
services that were important to maintaining ties to the locals. 
In short, with a few caveats, it does seem that my three conditions are necessary 
to ensure the longevity of AIGs.  The use of force by AIGs against their communities is 
obviously counterproductive.  However, most of AIGs’ operations are directed against 
the state’s apparatus.  Over the years, they have had to learn how to adapt to their 
changing environments in order to remain “credible.”  Committing violence against the 
state ensures that they remain “relevant” and present.   
In turn, governments have retaliated in kind, using force as a preventive measure.  
Although the use of force against insurgencies has largely been the method of choice, its 
rate of success has varied.  A notable success is the Sri Lanka case, which saw the civil 
conflict end in 2009.  The Sri Lankan government has been accused by the international 
community of committing egregious human rights violations by indiscriminately killing 
thousands of Tamil civilians in 2009 in its quest to end the conflict against the LTTE.  
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Despite the successful close to the conflict, Sri Lanka has become a pariah state within 
the international community.   
On the other hand, force has not worked in the three case studies.  In May of 
2013, Nigerian Jonathan Goodluck ordered an all-out military offensive, the first of many 
he claims, against Boko Haram in the state of Borno, which, according to the Guardian 
newspaper, instead of containing the fighters, pushed them to the neighboring borders of 
Chad, Niger and Cameroon.3  In fact, such “army abuses may be counter-productive 
because they stir anti-government rage that helps keep the insurgency going,” the article 
continues.4  
Both the Philippines and Mali are undergoing similar experiences with their 
respective AIGs.  In September 2013, the Filipino government launched a military 
offensive against Abu Sayyaf and another splinter group, the Bangsamoro Islamic 
Freedom fighters, after a dozen hostages were kidnapped in the southern city of 
Zamboanga.  The origins of this splinter group are unclear, but some have said that it 
broke away from the Moro National Liberation Front.5  Confirmation of these alliances 
comes from the Manila Standard, which says that fighting is spreading from Zamboanga 
City to Basilan, long considered the operational base for Abu Sayyaf.6  But if insurgent 
groups are uniting to remain relevant, then it would take a different strategy, and a longer 
time, to uproot these AIGs.  Meanwhile, the Filipino government continues to deny that 
                                                            
3	  “Almost	  1000	  have	  died	  in	  Nigerian	  jails	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  accessed	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  accessed	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this “domestic matter” is widening, and is confident that the conflict will be contained, 
according to The New York Times.7 Since the kidnapping, 300 armed rebels have been 
“holding off military forces in Zamboanga City” without a solution in sight.8 
In Mali, French troops succeeded in thwarting AQIM, but not expelling them 
from the country.  France turned over its security responsibilities for Mali to the UN in 
July 2013, but retains a small force in Mali.  However, northern Mali is still inaccessible 
and uncontrollable.  In the month of September 2013, AQIM targeted a Malian army post 
in Timbuktu in a suicide car-bomb attack, killing more than a dozen people.9  Another 
suicide attack in October of the same year left two Chadian peacekeepers dead, injuring 
nine, in the northern town of Tessalit.   As a result, there was a concerted military 
response by French, UN and Malian forces aimed at “preventing a resurgence of Islamist 
rebels in Mali,” which ended without a decisive win.10 In other words, military offensives 
have not yet succeeded in containing AQIM, much less disbanding the group.    
Clearly, in all three cases, and despite continuing counter-insurgency efforts, 
these AIGs are continuing their operations in their respective countries.  As with any 
problem, the next step requires the search for effective solutions.   Because insurgencies 
generally target the state, and they are a major security issue, the use of force is the most 
compelling choice.  However, the Sri Lankan case is a good example of why the use of 
force cannot be established as a norm, given the weight of international laws.   The ready 
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  “New	  Clash,”	  nytimes.com,	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  accessed	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use of force, and the potential for its abuse by governments, might set a bad precedent for 
countries.  Also, in all three cases studied here, large-scale offensives, often with outside 
help, have failed to curb any of the insurgency. 
A better solution would be to create opportunities that allow both governments 
and AIGs to avail themselves of the services of international organizations (IOs) and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs).  First, insurgencies must be securitized by the 
international community so that they occupy a central place on the global agenda.  Laws, 
treaties, conferences, and policy coordination should evolve as a matter of course.  
Second, national governments must be “pressured” into accepting outside help once 
insurgencies are identified as major threats.  Because of the deep mistrust between the 
two sides in conflict, third parties can serve as effective mediators, and advisers, in 
domestic conflicts.  In fact, the ASG has already requested that the Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation or the UN be involved in any peaceful negotiations in order to 
resolve the ongoing conflict.  It remains to be seen if this offer will be taken up by the 
Filipino government.  States are often deeply suspicious of the “intentions” of outside 
groups, and see conflicts as domestic issues.  However, a state’s sovereignty is not 
necessarily compromised if it uses the available means to address the realties that 
threaten its existence.  Insurgencies that are persisting over lengthy periods are proving 
too costly to the very countries that can ill afford to eliminate them. 
The last solution, and the most difficult one, is to tackle the root causes of 
conflicts, which stem from political and economic instability.  As we saw, ungoverned 
spaces, weak domestic institutions and local support, all contribute to sustaining 
insurgencies, though the exact contribution of each is difficult to measure.  Using a 
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different lens, a question is asked: where exactly do insurgencies occur?  Countries with 
good governance tend to have better economic stability than others without.  So, most 
“stable” countries have few or no insurgent conflicts.  The converse is true for countries 
struggling to deal with economic privation, corruption and autocracy.  The root solution, 
therefore, would be to improve the economic conditions of the people, who have had to 
endure decades of economic misery.  In most cases, sustained economic privation creates 
the conditions for forms of protests or conflicts.  Any solution requires coordination 
among governments, international agencies and civil society (domestic as well as global).  
One good effort that should be cited is the commitment made by 189 countries, including 
Nigeria, the Philippines and Mali, to meet the Millennium Development Goals set out in 
the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration.  It is also a positive sign that already, before the 
targeted date of 2015, the goal of halving global poverty has been met. 	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